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INTRODUCTION 
Among all the biblical wisdom, there is one lesson in particular 
that many business people ought, yet consistently fail, to heed. That 
lesson is found in Proverbs 22:26–27, which reads: “Don’t agree to 
guarantee another person’s debt or put up security for someone else. 
If you can’t pay it, even your bed will be snatched from under you.”1 
Despite the Bible’s admonitions against guaranteeing debt, guaranty 
contracts today are “ubiquitous[,]” or in other words, “probably as 
common as personal property security or real mortgages, and surely 
of wider application.”2 
In 2014, revered Judge Richard Posner of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit3 penned an opinion in 
Inland Mortgage Capital Corp. v. Chivas Retail Partners, LLC4 that 
saved some guarantors, who had failed to heed that biblical warning, 
from suffering a fate worse than even the Bible foresaw—becoming 
primarily liable for a primary borrower’s debts.5 The case centered on 
a Georgia anti-deficiency statute that precluded deficiency judgments 
against borrowers whose property was sold to the lender at a 
nonjudicial foreclosure sale.6 Chivas involved a standard commercial 
lending agreement: the lender executed a promissory note with the 
borrower company, and the owners of the company guaranteed the 
repayment of the debt in a separate contract of guaranty.7 Upon 
 
 1. Proverbs 22:26–27 (New Living Translation). 
 2. Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 47, 47 (1999).  
 3. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Richard Posner, the Judge, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1121 
(2007) (“Richard Posner is the most important legal thinker of our time	.	.	.	.”).  
 4. 740 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 5. See id. at 1149–50.  
 6. GA. CODE ANN. §	44-14-161 (2016). 
 7. Chivas, 740 F.3d at 1147–48. The language of the guaranty contract read as 
follows: 
if Lender [that is, IMCC] forecloses on any real property collateral	.	.	.	the amount 
of the debt may be reduced only by the price for which that collateral is sold at the 
foreclosure sale, even if the collateral is worth more than the sale price; and Lender 
95 N.C. L. REV. 857 (2017) 
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subsequent default by the borrower, the lender foreclosed on the 
property securing the loan under power of sale.8 It then pursued the 
guarantor-defendants—in this case, a limited liability company and 
several individuals who were not the borrowing company—for the 
remaining amount because the Georgia statute prevented pursuing 
the borrower for the remaining deficiency.9 Ultimately, the district 
court granted the lender’s motion for summary judgment and 
awarded it $17 million in damages.10 On appeal, the guarantors 
argued the Georgia anti-deficiency statute precluded the lenders from 
obtaining a judgment against them.11 Writing for a unanimous three-
judge panel, Judge Posner, after characterizing the defense as “a bit 
of Southern populism left over from the 1930s depression[,]”12 
affirmed the district court’s judgment.13 He noted that allowing this 
defense to be available to the guarantors would lead to a “topsy-turvy 
world” in which the lender would “sue the guarantor first, rather than 
the debtor, because if the [lender] lost a suit against a debtor the 
guaranty would (were [the defendant’s] defense accepted) be down 
the drain.”14 
The statute in Chivas has a North Carolina counterpart—the Fair 
Market Value Offset Defense (“FMVOD”).15 While the FMVOD has 
not caused headaches for lenders in their pursuit of guarantors in 
decades, the Supreme Court of North Carolina unwittingly brought 
the “topsy-turvy world” envisioned by Judge Posner to reality in High 
Point Bank & Trust Co. v. Highmark Properties, LLC.16 In this case, 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a guarantor may 
assert the FMVOD in its own right, thereby inviting the scenario in 
which “the guaranty would	.	.	.	be down the drain[,]” which could then 
 
may collect from Guarantor [that is, Chivas] even if Lender, by foreclosing on the 
real property collateral, has destroyed any rights Guarantor may have to collect 
from Borrower or anyone else. 
Id.  
 8. See id. at 1148. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Inland Mortg. Capital Corp. v. Chivas Retail Partners, LLC, 901 F. Supp. 2d 
1066, 1071 (N.D. Ill. 2012), aff’d, 740 F.3d 1146 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 11. See Chivas, 740 F.3d at 1149. The appeal was in a diversity suit, which is why the 
original Illinois proceeding led to discussion of the use of a Georgia statute. See id. at 1147. 
 12. Id. at 1148. 
 13. Id. at 1150. 
 14. Id.  
 15. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36 (2016). 
 16. 368 N.C. 301, 776 S.E.2d 838 (2015). 
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induce the lender to sue a guarantor in the same respect as they 
would sue a primary obligor.17 Cue the “topsy-turvy world.”18 
Already, readers may be asking themselves: “What is the big 
deal? What is the problem with extending this protection to 
guarantors in the first place?” For many, the interpretation this 
Comment proffers below may even appear facially inequitable. Why 
not give the “little guy” guarantors extra protections against the “big 
guy” banks? Can the banks not handle receiving a little less than they 
anticipated? Today, there is certainly little sympathy for banks. The 
“Too Big to Fail” era has dawned,19 and most Americans are fatigued 
by banks’ ability to survive the economic downturns, which average 
people feel the impact of most severely.20 However, as banks became 
more adept at securing favorable contract terms, American business 
people did as well; many of those business people have become 
especially savvy at protecting their interests.21 
The scrutiny that lenders—and their lawyers in particular—have 
given to this ruling highlights High Point Bank’s significance. One 
lively discussion of the impact compared the decision to football, 
framing the holding as analogous to “the entire offensive line [being] 
eligible to catch forward passes.”22 Another critic pondered whether 
post-foreclosure deficiency judgments were now “dead” in North 
Carolina.23 Regardless of the description, lawyers aware of High Point 
Bank and its relationship to their legal practice agree: the High Point 
 
 17. Chivas, 740 F.3d at 1150. For discussion of High Point Bank, see infra Part III.  
 18. Chivas, 740 F.3d at 1150. 
 19. See Heather Long, This Guy Thinks Banks Are STILL Too Big to Fail. And He’s 
Not Bernie Sanders, CNN MONEY (Apr. 18, 2016, 6:26 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/04
/18/investing/banks-too-big-to-fail-neel-kashkari/ [https://perma.cc/G6QN-NLX3]. 
 20. See generally Richard Burnett, J.D. Power Poll Outlines Customer ‘Exodus’ from 
Big Banks, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 27, 2012, 5:51 PM), http://articles.orlandosentinel
.com/2012-02-27/business/os-jdpower-banks-customer-losses-20120228_1_michael-beird-debit
-card-fee-community-banks [https://perma.cc/KJ7P-B4PY] (discussing how customers 
leaving big banks is a “testament to the	.	.	.	fatigue that consumers feel”). 
 21. See generally Divya Raghavan, Banking Tips from Small-Business Owners, 
NERDWALLET (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/small-business/tips-small
-business-owners/ [https://perma.cc/ZX46-Q7JM] (suggesting tips for business people to 
protect their interests). 
 22. William L. Esser IV, Tough News for Lenders—Major NC Supreme Court 
Decision on Collection of Post-Foreclosure Deficiencies, PARKER POE (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.parkerpoe.com/newsevents/2015/09/tough-news-for-lenders-major-nc-supreme
-court [https://perma.cc/3HV6-LA7T]. 
 23. Lance P. Martin, Are Deficiency Actions Now Dead in North Carolina?, WARD & 
SMITH, P.A. (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.wardandsmith.com/articles/post-foreclosure-
deficiency-actions-in-north-carolina [https://perma.cc/VH7S-BKLS]. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 857 (2017) 
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Bank decision will impact how lenders pursue debts following 
default.24 
In High Point Bank, the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
overturned decades of precedent of the Court of Appeals of North 
Carolina that allowed lenders to pursue guarantors for deficiencies 
without limitation by the FMVOD.25 Consequently, the highest 
court’s interpretation of the FMVOD and its failure to appreciate the 
policy consequences of ruling in the guarantors’ favor will have 
significant implications for how lenders pursue deficiency judgments 
in North Carolina. This Comment argues that the incentives created 
by High Point Bank could lead to more manifestly unjust 
consequences for guarantors and lenders going forward—
consequences that lawmakers can, and should, remedy by reforming 
the nonjudicial foreclosure and deficiency judgment process. 
This Comment proceeds in six parts. Part I briefly introduces 
relevant terms of art and outlines the scope of this discussion. Part II 
discusses the relevant historical context of the FMVOD statute and 
its application to guarantors since its adoption. Part III then details 
the pivotal High Point Bank case. Next, Part IV argues that a textual 
interpretation of the FMVOD statute makes High Point Bank a 
misguided opinion, while concurrently examining how some forgotten 
jurisprudence makes the High Point Bank decision reasonable. Part V 
addresses the options lenders may pursue in foreclosing and seeking 
deficiency judgments. Finally, Part VI analyzes different avenues for 
reform to prevent the unjust consequences to guarantors that will 
 
 24. See Stuart L. Pratt & David M. Schilli, Guarantors Now Have North Carolina 
Anti-Deficiency Defense in Collection Actions, ROBINSON BRADSHAW, Oct. 8, 2015, at 3, 
http://www.robinsonbradshaw.com/pp/publication-NC-Anti-Deficiency-Defense-in-Collection-
Actions-10-08-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/98YY-KYHS] (“High Point Bank	 cements a 
powerful new defense in collection actions that will likely permit a guarantor to survive 
summary judgment.”); Jay DeVaney & Brian T. Pearce, Deficiency Judgment Cases in 
North Carolina Just Got a Lot More Complex, NEXSEN PRUET (Sept. 25, 2015), http://
www.nexsenpruet.com/insights/centsability-deficiency-judgment-cases-in-north-carolina
-just-got-a-lot-more-complex [https://perma.cc/9GYJ-5XH8] (describing how guarantors 
might raise the FMVOD); B. Chad Ewing & Dirk Lasater, High Point Bank v. Highmark 
and Guarantor Liability in North Carolina, WOMBLE CARLYLE (Sept. 28, 2015), http://
www.wcsr.com/Insights/Articles/2015/September/High-Point-Bank-v-Highmark-and-Guarantor-
Liability-in-North-Carolina# [https://perma.cc/74EV-VEYF] (“Highmark represents a 
significant change in guarantor liability under North Carolina law	.	.	.	.”); Jill C. Walters, 
Secured Lenders—Stay on Top of the Law or Proceed at Your Own Risk, POYNER 
SPRUILL (Oct. 6, 2015), http://client.poynerspruill.com/publications/Pages/Secured-
LendersStayonTopofLaworProceedatOwnRisk.aspx [https://perma.cc/7KT7-XT3F] 
(suggesting solutions for lenders seeking to pivot post-foreclosure strategies following 
High Point Bank). 
 25. See infra Section II.C. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 857 (2017) 
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follow High Point Bank, including rewriting the FMVOD statute and 
encouraging lenders to bid higher at foreclosure. 
I.  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FORECLOSURE AND DEFICIENCY 
PROCESS 
This Comment begins with a discussion of various terms of art 
utilized in the world of guarantors, foreclosures, and deficiency 
judgments. A firm understanding of these terms is essential to 
appreciate the analysis contained herein. In the context of 
commercial lending, lenders often use different tools to ensure a full 
repayment of the money they have loaned, including a healthy return 
on their investment.26 One such tool, particularly used in the real 
estate development market, is the guaranty contract.27 Guaranty 
contracts have three different participants: the borrower,28 the 
lender,29 and the guarantor.30 Generally, a guaranty contract is an 
agreement between a third party other than the primary borrower to 
pay the debt of that borrower in the event of default on payments to 
the lender.31 This contract serves as a type of collateral for the loan;32 
however, how the lender pursues this collateral agreement depends 
on the type of guaranty created at the origination of the loan.33 
There are a number of different types of guaranties available to 
lenders, but this Comment addresses only two types: the guaranty of 
 
 26. See generally Gary S. Gunn & Glenn P. Valentine, Commercial Real Estate Loan 
Documentation: Best Practices and Lessons (Hopefully) Learned During the Financial 
Crisis (Mar. 29–30, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.hwa.com/content
/documents/Paper_Final_w_Exhibits_Publish_Quality.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YMP-R8JW] 
(presented at the Texas Bankers Ass’n, 38th Annual Legal Conference) (describing 
different tools utilized by commercial lenders to ensure profitable return on their 
investments). 
 27. See id. at 4. 
 28. This is also known as the “principal” or “obligor”—the primarily liable entity. See 
5-44 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW §	44.03[2] (Theodore Eisenberg ed., 15th ed. 2015). 
 29. This is also known as the “creditor” or “obligee”—the party extending the credit. 
See id. 
 30. A guarantor is a separate third party who is not the main borrowing party. See id. 
§	44.03[1]. 
 31. See id. (“A ‘guaranty’ is a promise to answer for the payment of some debt or the 
performance of some duty, in the case of the failure of another person who is primarily 
liable for such payment or performance.”). 
 32. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured Finance: The New Way to Securitize Assets, 11 
CARDOZO L. REV. 607, 610–11 (1990) (listing guaranty agreements as a type of credit 
enhancement in the context of securitization and noting “[t]he goal is that a creditworthy 
third party assures” full repayment). By providing a third party to assure payment of a 
primary debt, the guaranty provides a lender with a means of recovery other than through 
the principal borrower. See id.; supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 33. See 5-44 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 28, §	44.03[1]. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 857 (2017) 
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collection and the guaranty of payment.34 The guaranty of collection 
is what many people likely associate with the term “guaranty”—upon 
exhaustion of all avenues of collection against the borrower, the 
lender may pursue the guarantor on the guaranty of collection for the 
outstanding amount due on the loan, otherwise known as the 
deficiency.35 Guaranties of payment operate differently. Instead of 
exhausting all other options for satisfying the debt first, the lender 
may proceed directly against the guarantor at the moment of 
default.36 
Guaranty contracts benefit both the borrower and the lender in a 
commercial lending agreement; borrowers who have a third party sign 
a guaranty contract to vouch for their ability to repay benefit from 
lenders who are more willing to grant favorable lending terms.37 
Lenders, in turn, benefit by minimizing the risk of not being repaid.38 
If the borrower fails to repay its debt, the lender is more likely to fully 
recover the amount of its loan, hopefully with at least some return on 
investment.39 When a commercial lending transaction goes right, 
guaranty contracts are inconsequential—the borrower pays their 
debts as they become due and everyone lives happily ever after; 
however, when a borrower defaults, the guarantor becomes a crucial 
party to lenders in their attempts to be paid in full.40 Normally, when 
a borrower defaults, the lender will foreclose on the property securing 
the loan (the collateral),41 and then seek to recover the remaining 
 
 34. For those interested in other types of guaranty contracts, see Peter A. Alces, The 
Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial Transactions, 61 N.C. L. REV. 
655, 656–57 (1983) (“A guaranty may be absolute, conditional, general, special, 
continuing, unlimited, a guaranty of payment, or of collection or collectability.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 35. See 5-44 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 28, §	44.03[3][b][ii]. 
 36. See id. §	44.03[3][b][i]. 
 37. See Katz, supra note 2, at 54, 64–74 (noting that intercorporate guaranties will 
lower the interest rate charged by a lender and providing economic analysis which 
demonstrates how credit is cheaper with a guarantor than without one); see also Robert J. 
Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender 
Beware, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 235–39 (1976) (explaining “upstream” and “cross-stream” 
guaranties, wherein a lender will require a guarantee of some business relation, whether 
parent-subsidiary or affiliate, for less-than-creditworthy borrowers before extending 
credit). 
 38. See Katz, supra note 2, at 59 (“Guaranties are a response to potential moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems: they help protect creditors against some of the 
risks of debtor misbehavior or insolvency by shifting those risks to guarantors. In so doing, 
guaranties enlist the guarantor’s efforts in reducing or managing those risks.”).  
 39. See id. at 52–53.  
 40. See id. at 59. 
 41. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.16 (2016) (requiring notice and hearing before a 
clerk of court to initiate the power of sale foreclosure in North Carolina).  
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amount of the debt in a deficiency judgment.42 Thus, the first step for 
a lender seeking to recover an unpaid debt is to exhaust all forms of 
collection against the debtor—foreclosing on the borrower’s 
collateral.43 
In North Carolina, there are two possible avenues for foreclosing 
collateral.44 The traditional option is judicial foreclosure, whereby a 
lender brings an action against a defaulting debtor to sell property 
securing the loan and credit the amount garnered to the remaining 
debt.45 While every state has a provision for judicial foreclosure,46 this 
approach is typically inefficient and expensive.47 So as an alternative 
to this costly action, approximately half the states have adopted the 
nonjudicial, or power of sale, foreclosure.48 In a nonjudicial 
foreclosure, a lender can foreclose on collateral without direct judicial 
oversight or the costly and time-consuming facets of judicial 
foreclosure.49 North Carolina also has a nonjudicial foreclosure 
option, although the framework has some semblance of judicial 
 
 42. See Carolina Bank v. Chatham Station, Inc., 186 N.C. App. 424, 428, 651 S.E.2d 
386, 389 (2007) (“If the foreclosure sale of real property which secures a non-purchase 
money mortgage fails to yield the full amount of due debt, the mortgagee may sue for a 
deficiency judgment.” (citing Blanton v. Sisk, 70 N.C. App. 70, 71, 318 S.E.2d 560, 561 
(1984), abrogated by Paynter v. Maggiolo, 105 N.C. App. 312, 412 S.E.2d 691 (1992))); see 
also Deficiency Judgment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A judgment 
against a debtor for the unpaid balance of the debt if a foreclosure sale or a sale of 
repossessed personal property fails to yield the full amount of the debt due.”). 
 43. See supra text accompanying notes 41–42. 
 44. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§	1-339.1 to .40 (judicial foreclosure process); see also id. 
§§	45-21.1 to .33A (nonjudicial foreclosure process).  
 45. See id. §	1-339.1(a) (defining judicial sale in North Carolina).  
 46. See LEXISNEXIS, 50-STATE SURVEYS OF STATUTES & REGULATIONS: JUDICIAL 
FORECLOSURE	(Jan. 2016) (showing that all fifty states have a judicial foreclosure 
provision). 
 47. See Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the 
Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 586–88 (2010) 
(describing the judicial foreclosure process as “inefficient[,]” especially compared to 
nonjudicial foreclosure). Perhaps the greatest proof of this inefficiency is its inclusion in 
Black’s Law Dictionary under the definition of judicial foreclosure. See Deficiency 
Judgment, supra note 42 (referring to judicial foreclosure as “costly and time-consuming”). 
 48. See	 LEXISNEXIS, 50-STATE SURVEYS OF STATUTES & REGULATIONS: NON-
JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE (Jan. 2016) (showing that thirty states have some provision for 
nonjudicial foreclosures). 
 49. See In re Foreclosure of Deed of Tr. Recorded in Book 911, at Page 512, Catawba 
Cty. Registry, 50 N.C. App. 69, 79, 272 S.E.2d 893, 899 (1980) (“The power of sale is 
simply a speedy and inexpensive way to obtain the equivalent results of a judicial 
foreclosure.”), rev’d, 303 N.C. 514 (1981); see also Power-of-Sale Foreclosure, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (describing nonjudicial foreclosure as lacking “the 
stringent notice requirements, procedural burdens, or delays of a judicial foreclosure” in 
North Carolina). An aspect of the nonjudicial framework that suggests at least some 
judicial oversight is the hearing before the clerk of court. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.16.  
95 N.C. L. REV. 857 (2017) 
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oversight in the form of notice and hearing before the clerk of court 
at the outset of a power of sale foreclosure.50 In North Carolina, a 
lender may pursue a deficiency judgment to recover the remaining 
amount of debt (the deficiency) after the foreclosure sale.51 Anti-
deficiency statutes exist to prevent lenders from taking advantage of 
borrowers, particularly following nonjudicial foreclosures.52 Some 
statutes expressly prohibit deficiency judgments in cases where a 
lender forecloses on property obtained by a purchase money 
mortgage.53 Others, such as the FMVOD, allow all borrowers, 
regardless of the structure of the underlying transaction, an offset 
defense.54 
One of the simplest definitions of an offset defense is 
“[s]omething (such as an amount or claim) that balances or 
compensates for something else.”55 In lender-borrower relationships, 
an offset is more specifically “[a] debtor’s right to reduce the amount 
of a debt by any sum the creditor owes the debtor; the 
counterbalancing sum owed by the creditor.”56 Therefore, fair market 
value offset defenses prevent lenders from pursuing borrowers for a 
 
 50. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.16(a). 
 51. See id. §	45-21.36. 
 52. See infra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Antideficiency Legislation, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Legislation enacted to limit the rights of 
secured creditors to recover in excess of the security.”).  
 53. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.38. A purchase-money mortgage is a mortgage 
which “is made as a part of the same transaction in which the debtor purchases land, 
embraces the land so purchased, and secures all or part of its purchase price.” Dobias v. 
White, 239 N.C. 409, 412, 80 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1954). 
  Previous scholarship has discussed this statute at length, which is analogous in 
many ways to the statute at issue in this Comment. See, e.g., Joel M. Craig, Comment, 
Mortgages and Deeds of Trust—Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co.: North 
Carolina Anti-Deficiency Judgment Statute Bars Personal Actions Against Purchase Money 
Mortgagors, 58 N.C. L. REV. 855, 865 (1980) (questioning the “wisdom of permitting the 
statute to remain in force” because the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s “construction 
of the statute disrupts traditional allocation of risk concepts in commercial real estate 
transactions”). See generally G. Stephen Diab, Comment, North Carolina Extends Its Anti-
Deficiency Statute: Merritt v. Edwards Ridge, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1446 (1989) (discussing the 
expansion of section 45-21.38’s protection after Merritt v. Edwards Ridge). 
 54. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36. Note that “courts use the terms ‘offset’ and 
‘setoff’ interchangeably, often switching between them from sentence to sentence, 
supporting the conclusion that there is no substantive difference between them.” 2 ANN 
TAYLOR SCHWING, CALIFORNIA AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES §	44:1 (2d ed. 1996) (citations 
omitted). 
 55. Offset, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 56. Setoff, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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deficiency if lenders have paid less than fair market value at a 
foreclosure under power of sale.57 
The remainder of this Part utilizes several charts to help explain 
how the commercial lending transaction plays out, from inception to 
default and deficiency. Figure 1 illustrates a typical intercorporate 
guaranty between a fictional entity and a fictional bank: 
 
Figure 1: Intercorporate Guaranty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 1, ABC, LLC seeks a $100,000 loan from a lender. 
XYZ Bank is willing to lend this money but wants to ensure that it 
will be repaid in full with interest. Accordingly, XYZ requires ABC 
to offer up collateral to secure the loan. ABC owns property worth 
$80,000 and provides it as security by executing a promissory note and 
deed of trust. However, XYZ’s loan is undersecured, so it also 
requires A, B, and C (the owners of ABC) to sign a guaranty contract 
as a credit enhancement to further ensure the loan will be repaid in 
full. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36. The difference between fair market value 
and a foreclosure bid deemed substantial enough to allow such a setoff depends on the 
state. Some states, such as Georgia, prevent deficiency judgments without judicial 
oversight. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §	44-14-161(a) (2016). 
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Figure 2: Default and Collection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 2, ABC begins paying off its loan, and is able 
to get the balance down to $75,000. But ABC struggles to make its 
payments and ultimately defaults. XYZ then forecloses pursuant to 
the power of sale included in the deed of trust. After its hearing 
before the clerk of court, ABC’s property is put up for sale, but XYZ 
is the only bidder who shows up and bids. XYZ purchases the 
collateral for $60,000, leaving a $15,000 balance on the note. 
 
Figure 3: Deficiency Judgment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates how XYZ may then recover this 
deficiency. As discussed earlier, XYZ had ABC execute a note and 
A, B, and C execute separate guaranties. Following the default and 
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foreclosure, the guaranty becomes especially important. At this point, 
XYZ can sue both ABC on the note and A, B, and C on their 
separate guaranties. XYZ may then recover the full amount of the 
debt against these parties. 
Since ABC is the property owner, once it is sued, it may assert 
the FMVOD to prevent a lender from recovering any deficient 
amounts outstanding, claiming that the fair market value of the 
property is the worth of the outstanding debt.58 Assuming ABC would 
succeed in this defense, the question remains: Can the guarantors also 
benefit from this anti-deficiency statute? The following Part traces the 
history of the FMVOD statute from its adoption through the High 
Point Bank case to demonstrate the divergent trends in case law 
leading to that decision. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF THE FMVOD STATUTE AND ITS APPLICATION 
TO GUARANTORS 
Whether guarantors can benefit from the FMVOD is the central 
issue of this Comment, as the High Point Bank case presents 
significant implications for guarantors and lenders alike. Having 
presented an understanding of relevant terminology, this Part 
contextualizes the High Point Bank decision by tracing the history of 
the FMVOD statute from its Depression-era adoption through the 
twentieth century. This history will explain how the law has evolved 
from a limited defense for borrowers like ABC to expansive equitable 
protection for guarantors like A, B, and C. The historical setting and 
adoption of the FMVOD statute provide context for a discussion of 
how courts have applied the FMVOD contained therein. Early case 
law, deemed “forgotten jurisprudence” by this Comment, illustrates 
the limited analysis given to the FMVOD statute that suggested a 
more expansive reading than it was given in the intervening decades. 
These decades between the statute’s adoption and the High Point 
Bank case largely ignored this early case law and originated a 
different, textual interpretation of the FMVOD statute. This 
historical discussion culminates in the next Part with High Point 
Bank, which represents a revival of forgotten jurisprudence while 
ignoring important textual analysis that developed in the decades 
prior to that decision. 
 
 58. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36.  
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A. The Adoption of the FMVOD Statute 
The FMVOD was brought to life in the midst of the Great 
Depression.59 When the statute was passed, the text of that statute 
read as follows: 
When any sale of real estate or personal property has been 
made by a mortgagee, trustee, or other person authorized to 
make the same, at which the mortgagee, payee or other holder 
of the obligation thereby secured becomes the purchaser and 
takes title either directly or indirectly, and thereafter such 
mortgagee, payee or other holder of the secured obligation, as 
aforesaid, shall sue for and undertake to recover a deficiency 
judgment against the mortgagor, trustor or other maker of any 
such obligation whose property has been so purchased, it shall 
be competent and lawful for the defendant against whom such 
deficiency judgment is sought to allege and show as matter of 
defense and off-set, but not by way of counter-claim, that the 
property sold was fairly worth the amount of the debt secured 
by it at the time and place of sale or that the amount bid was 
substantially less than its true value, and, upon such showing, to 
defeat or off-set any deficiency judgment against him, either in 
whole or in part	.	.	.	.60 
The statute has generally been limited in scope: it does not apply to 
nonjudicial foreclosures where the purchaser is a third party, nor does 
it apply to judicial foreclosures.61 Additionally, the statute underwent 
a minor change in 194962 and then a substantive change in 1967, which 
removed personal property from the statute’s purview due to the 
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.63 But as has been noted 
in subsequent scholarship, there is hardly any legislative history 
available to inform interpretation of the statute.64 
 
 59. See Brainerd Currie & Mark S. Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State 
Lines: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 1960 DUKE L.J. 1, 11 (1960).  
 60. Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 275, §	3, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 401, 402–03 (codified at 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36). 
 61. See id. §	3, 1933 N.C. Sess. at 403. 
 62. See Act of Apr. 1, 1949, ch. 720, §	3(d), 1949 N.C. Sess. Laws 788, 803 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36) (changing the location of the FMVOD by placing 
it in the same section as other deficiency judgment statutes). 
 63. See Act of May 23, 1967, ch. 562, §	2(12), 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 603, 607 (codified 
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36) (removing “or personal property” from the 
FMVOD). This amendment also limits the scope of this Comment, which is confined to 
real property transactions, and leaves all matters of interpretation of the Uniform 
Commercial Code to existing legal scholarship. 
 64. See Currie & Lieberman, supra note 59, at 11. Any available legislative history 
pertains solely to procedural matters; there are no annotations, debates, or commentary 
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In an article discussing the passing of the FMVOD, Professors 
Brainerd Currie and Mark Lieberman provide context for the flurry 
of anti-deficiency legislation introduced in 1933, both in North 
Carolina65 and across the nation.66 The early 1930s were arguably the 
most difficult years of the Great Depression.67 At that time, the 
country was still reeling from the market crash in 1929, and the 
legislature was on the precipice of a burgeoning foreclosure crisis.68 In 
North Carolina, the legislature responded by changing the nature of 
deficiency judgments from being granted “as a matter of course” to 
having significant new limitations, notably allowing the mortgagor to 
“prove the fair value of the land in defense to the action for the 
deficiency,” to afford debtors some relief.69 This changed the 
 
available to give researchers insight into the legislative mind. See H. JOURNAL, 1933 Sess. 
186, 262, 286, 313, 320, 576, 667, 681 (N.C. 1933) (encompassing the bill’s introduction, 
passage in the North Carolina House of Representatives, referral to the North Carolina 
Senate, and ultimate passage and adoption as amended). 
 65. See Currie & Lieberman, supra note 59, at 11–12 (describing the various anti-
deficiency statutes enacted in North Carolina in 1933). 
 66. See id. at 13–14, 13 n.48 (including scholarly pieces written around the time of the 
Great Depression that comprehensively detail legislative efforts to mitigate the impact of 
the economic crisis on debtors). 
 67. See id. at 11. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 13. The Currie and Lieberman version of the bill’s history has essentially 
become canon due to the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s reliance on it in High Point 
Bank and a previous decision regarding the purchase-money mortgage anti-deficiency 
statute. See High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 368 N.C. 301, 305–06 
n.1, 776 S.E.2d 838, 842 n.1 (2015); Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., 296 
N.C. 366, 370–71, 250 S.E.2d 271, 273–74 (1979); Currie & Lieberman, supra note 59, at 
11–12. However, this narrow historical perspective may be limiting. The full history and 
context of the statute may be more illuminating. For example, perhaps the agricultural 
economy that prevailed in North Carolina at that time was a large motivator for extending 
protection from lenders. See RoAnn Bishop, Difficult Days on Tar Heel Farms, N.C. 
MUSEUM OF HISTORY: TAR HEEL JUNIOR HISTORIAN (Fall 2010), reprinted in 
Agriculture in North Carolina During the Great Depression, NCPEDIA.ORG (Jan. 1, 2010), 
http://ncpedia.org/agriculture/great-depression?page=1 [https://perma.cc/78S9-SGUT] (“In 
the 1920s, North Carolina was still very much a rural state. Half of its total population 
lived on working farms. Agriculture was its largest industry.”). Consequently, policy 
concerns likely reflected that fact. See George M. Platt, Deficiency Judgments in Oregon 
Loans Secured by Land: Growing Disparity Among Functional Equivalents, 23 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 37, 50 (1987) (“The policy underlying the early Oregon [anti-
deficiency] law probably was the protection of homeowners and farmers. This is the same 
policy which motivated most of the 1930s’ deficiency judgment laws around the country.”); 
Sarah M. Vogel, The Law of Hard Times: Debtor and Farmer Relief Actions of the 1933 
North Dakota Legislative Session, 60 N.D. L. REV. 489, 489–90 nn.1–2 (1984) (noting how 
state legislatures focused on relieving the agricultural sector and citing the FMVOD as an 
example of such relief); A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1933, 11 N.C. 
L. REV. 191, 240 (1933) (“The immediate cause of this legislation was doubtless the 
hardship wrought upon mortgagors by having their lands sold at inadequate prices due to 
the depression.” (emphasis added)). This argument gains credence when considering that 
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collections process by placing limitations on deficiency judgments, 
curbing lenders who might harm borrowers whose very livelihoods 
may have depended on the foreclosed collateral and protecting 
borrowers from lender overreach.70 However, unfortunately for 
anyone looking to the legislative history and historical context of this 
statute for guidance as to how it should be applied, there is simply not 
enough evidence of the 1933 North Carolina General Assembly’s 
intent. And there certainly is not enough historical evidence to 
determine whether the FMVOD statute was meant to apply to 
guarantors. This lack of historical and legislative context proved 
difficult for judicial interpretation going forward, as the following 
sections illustrate. 
B. Forgotten Jurisprudence? Richmond Mortgage and Dunlop as 
Depression-Era Guidance 
Although the FMVOD statute was born in the context of an era 
of severe economic difficulties, it spawned its own set of 
jurisprudential challenges, specifically relating to its infringement into 
areas once considered outside of the legislature’s purview. As is 
expected for laws that impact lender-borrower relationships, the 
FMVOD statute was challenged from its inception as an 
unconstitutional impairment of the freedom of contract.71 In 
Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,72 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the constitutionality of 
 
agricultural debtors were likely to be less educated than other debtors due to the duties of 
farm life. See Anita Price Davis, Keeping the School Doors Open, N.C. MUSEUM OF 
HISTORY: TAR HEEL JUNIOR HISTORIAN (Spring 2010), reprinted in Public Schools in the 
Great Depression: Keeping the Doors Open, NCPEDIA.ORG (Jan. 1, 2010), http://ncpedia
.org/public-schools-great-depression [https://perma.cc/NNZ3-B3ZQ] (noting the particular 
difficulties encountered by rural youth in balancing the responsibilities of farm life with 
the demands of school). Moreover, the failure and repossession of farmland had a ripple 
effect on North Carolina’s farm-driven economy. See Bishop, supra. Family farm failure 
left owners less able to sustain themselves, leading them and their families to turn to 
tenant farming, sharecropping, or migrant work, or to seek better fortunes in the city. See 
id. Farm failures also put tenant farmers and sharecroppers out of work. See id. Lenders 
suffered as a result of these failures, too—even without the FMVOD, banks failed as a 
result of farmers’ inabilities to repay their debts. See David Walbert, 1.3: The Depression 
for Farmers, LEARN NC, http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/nchist-worldwar/5955 
[https://perma.cc/S6VH-PUTE]. As all of this scholarship indicates, the North Carolina 
General Assembly, whose members largely represented rural residents of the state, 
appears to have taken it upon itself to provide some anti-deficiency protection for the 
farmers, even while banks continued failing across North Carolina.  
 70. See discussion supra note 69. 
 71. See, e.g., Richmond Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., 210 N.C. 
29, 33, 185 S.E. 482, 484 (1936), aff’d, 300 U.S. 124 (1937). 
 72. 210 N.C. 29, 185 S.E. 482 (1936). 
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the FMVOD statute.73 The facts of the case involved a typical lending 
scenario: defendants borrowed money secured by a deed of trust; 
defendant defaulted, whereupon the bank foreclosed under the power 
of sale contained in said deed; a company controlled by the lending 
bank acquired the property; and the amount was credited to the 
defendant’s remaining debts.74 In a subsequent deficiency suit, the 
defendant asserted the FMVOD, extinguishing its liability for the 
debt.75 
On appeal, the bank argued that the FMVOD statute was 
unconstitutional pursuant to, inter alia, the contracts clause of the 
United States Constitution.76 The Supreme Court of North Carolina 
held that the FMVOD statute “does not impair the obligation of 
contracts[,]” but instead “provides protection for debtors whose 
property has been sold and purchased by their creditors for a sum 
which was not a fair value of the property at the time of the sale” by 
providing for judicial oversight.77 Because the FMVOD statute did 
not impair the obligation of contracts, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina was “of the opinion that the statute is valid, and so h[e]ld.”78  
The Supreme Court of North Carolina was not the court of last 
resort in this instance; the case was appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court, which affirmed the case.79 Writing for a unanimous 
Court, Justice Roberts noted that the obligation of contract was not 
impaired because the statute “recognizes the obligation of [the] 
contract and [the] right to its full enforcement but limits that right so 
as to prevent [a litigant from] obtaining more than [what is] due.”80 
Moreover, the availability of alternative methods of recovery like 
judicial foreclosure, combined with the decision not to entirely 
eradicate nonjudicial foreclosures, pushed the weight of the Court’s 
opinion further in favor of the statute’s constitutionality.81 
Over a year after the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Richmond Mortgage, the Supreme Court of North Carolina faced a 
 
 73. Id. at 34, 185 S.E. at 485. 
 74. See id. at 30–31, 185 S.E. at 483. 
 75. See id. at 31–32, 185 S.E. at 483–84. 
 76. See id. at 33, 185 S.E. at 484 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §	10). 
 77. Id. at 35, 185 S.E. at 485. 
 78. Id. at 34, 185 S.E. at 485. In holding that the FMVOD statute was constitutional, 
the court utilized reasoning that it would later use to recharacterize the FMVOD statute 
from a legal defense into an equitable one. See id.; infra Section III.C. 
 79. Richmond Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., 300 U.S. 124, 131 
(1937). 
 80. Id. at 130. 
 81. See id. at 130–31. 
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soon-to-be-familiar fact pattern in Virginia Trust Co. v. Dunlop.82 In 
that case, the defendant was the guarantor of a loan secured by the 
borrower’s property; the borrower defaulted, and the lender 
foreclosed on the property securing the loan by nonjudicial 
foreclosure.83 When the lender pursued the guarantor for the 
deficient amount of almost $4,000, the guarantor asserted the 
FMVOD as a defense to collection.84 The lender challenged this 
assertion, arguing that the language of the statute limited its 
application to “the mortgagor, trustor, or other maker of any such 
obligation whose property has been so purchased [at foreclosure].”85 
The trial court denied the lender’s motion to strike, an order from 
which the lender appealed.86 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the trial court’s 
order.87 However, the court’s wavering and noncommittal language 
relating to the scope of the ruling has been, and continues to be, the 
source of much confusion.88 The court held that the lender’s motion 
to strike was properly denied, stating that “[i]f the defense provided 
in [the FMVOD statute] is available to the defendants in this case, 
they are entitled to introduce evidence of the facts constituting such 
defense on the trial.”89 Therefore, the court appeared to extend the 
defense to guarantors.90 The opinion then concluded with more 
equivocating dicta, pondering whether the lender had a right to this 
appeal from a denial of a motion to strike in the first place.91 
Ultimately, the court left the question temporarily undecided, 
concluding that the merits of the appeal dealt solely with the 
 
 82. 214 N.C. 196, 198 S.E. 645 (1938). The soon-to-be-familiar fact pattern referenced 
above is that of High Point Bank & Trust Co. v. Highmark Properties, LLC, 368 N.C. 301, 
776 S.E.2d 838 (2015). See infra Part III. 
 83. Dunlop, 214 N.C. at 196–97, 198 S.E. at 645. 
 84. See id. at 197, 198 S.E. at 645. At this point, the guarantor had passed away, so the 
executors of his estate were defending the case. Id. 
 85. Id. at 198, 198 S.E. at 646 (citing Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 275, §	3, 1933 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 401, 402–03 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36 (2016)).  
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 199, 198 S.E. at 647. 
 88. See infra Section II.C, Part III. 
 89. Dunlop, 214 N.C. at 198, 198 S.E. at 646. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 199, 198 S.E. at 647 (“We are not sure of plaintiff’s right to appeal on 
this matter	.	.	.	since the same question could have been raised on objections to the 
evidence and, if necessary, reviewed on appeal from the final judgment, and it does not 
now appear that any substantial right has been affected.” (citing Pemberton v. City of 
Greensboro, 203 N.C. 514, 515, 166 S.E. 396, 396–97 (1932)).  
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relevancy of the guarantor’s pleading of the FMVOD.92 Accordingly, 
the holding of this case was that, at the pleading stage of the case, a 
guarantor was entitled to assert the FMVOD; however, the court 
reserved judgment on whether the FMVOD actually applied to 
guarantors in equity to a later case and time—apparently to when the 
High Point Bank case arrived at the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina in 2015.93 
Dicta from Richmond Mortgage and Dunlop laid the 
groundwork for the interpretation of the FMVOD in the context of 
guarantors in North Carolina going forward. In upholding the 
constitutionality of the FMVOD in Richmond Mortgage, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina posited that the borrower’s assertion of the 
defense reduces the amount of indebtedness in future deficiency 
judgments.94 Dunlop, in terms that seem equivocal and compromising 
today, seemingly “d[id] not deny” a guarantor’s right to assert the 
FMVOD; by stating in dicta that “it would not be an unreasonable 
interpretation” to determine that the lender’s acquisition of secured 
property by power of sale could extinguish the debt based on 
principles of equity, the court seemed to lend support to the notion 
that guarantors could at the very least argue that the FMVOD 
applied in equity.95 Taken as precedent, these cases would have made 
an otherwise expedient process more difficult for lenders seeking to 
recover the full amount of their debt. Under this framework, 
Richmond Mortgage’s dicta would apply the fair market value of the 
property directly to the borrower’s debt,96 and Dunlop’s dicta 
 
 92. See id. (“[S]ince the holding is adverse to plaintiff’s contention, and the appeal has 
precedent, we prefer to decide the matter upon the merits.”); see also Branch Banking & 
Tr. Co. v. Smith, 239 N.C. App. 293, 299–300, 769 S.E.2d 638, 643 (2015) (pointing to the 
dicta in Dunlop as evidence of the holding in that same case, i.e., that the guarantor’s 
assertion of the FMVOD was not an irrelevant pleading that could be struck), disc. review 
denied, 368 N.C. 353, 777 S.E.2d 66 (2015) (mem.). 
 93. Dunlop, 214 N.C. at 198–99, 198 S.E. at 646–47. Even legal observers of this 
opinion at the time noted that the court failed to hold whether the FMVOD was actually 
available to guarantors. See, e.g., Oscar Leak Tyree, Comment, Mortgages—Statutes 
Modifying Deficiency Judgments—Availability to Sureties, 17 N.C. L. REV. 179, 179 (1939) 
(arguing that while Dunlop “apparently did not find it necessary” to decide whether the 
FMVOD applied to guarantors beyond their right to plead the defense, the FMVOD 
statute should be construed to apply to guarantors based on equitable principles and the 
policy of the FMVOD statute).  
 94. Richmond Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., 210 N.C. 29, 34, 185 
S.E. 482, 485 (1936), aff’d, 300 U.S. 124 (1937). 
 95. Dunlop, 214 N.C. at 198–99, 198 S.E. at 646.  
 96. See Richmond Mortgage, 210 N.C. at 34, 185 S.E. at 485 (stating that creditor 
“shall not recover judgment against his debtor for any deficiency	.	.	.	without first 
accounting to his debtor for the fair value of the property[.]”).  
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supports the notion that the debt is equitably extinguished in its 
entirety by preventing further pursuit of the deficiency against 
guarantors.97 
Nevertheless, after these cases, North Carolina courts largely 
failed to utilize this case law as precedent in the manner that the dicta 
in Richmond Mortgage and Dunlop seemingly intended. In fact, in 
subsequent years, North Carolina appellate courts only cited Dunlop 
for the test for relevancy of a pleading.98 Out of the numerous North 
Carolina appellate court decisions that cite Dunlop prior to High 
Point Bank, only three deal with the issue of whether guarantors can 
assert the FMVOD on their behalf.99 However, even in those cases, 
the application of the Dunlop decision was not tested. For example, 
one holding failed to allow a guarantor the protection of the FMVOD 
because the foreclosure was by judicial order.100 Similarly, the 
appellate level cases applied Dunlop to section 45-21.38 of the North 
Carolina General Statutes, which narrowly addresses purchase money 
mortgages.101 
Likewise, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Richmond Mortgage 
has not been applied to matters arising under the FMVOD statute at 
all.102 Instead, Richmond Mortgage is merely cited for the proposition 
 
 97. See Dunlop, 214 N.C. at 198–99, 198 S.E. at 646–47 (emphasizing that it could be a 
reasonable interpretation that the “statute	.	.	.	proceeds upon the equitable assumption” 
that debt is discharged upon debtor taking possession of land). 
 98. Id. at 198, 198 S.E. at 646. See, e.g., Gamble v. Stutts, 262 N.C. 276, 280, 136 S.E.2d 
688, 690–91 (1964); Briggs v. Dickey, 249 N.C. 640, 641, 107 S.E.2d 85, 86 (1959); Weant v. 
McCanless, 235 N.C. 384, 386, 70 S.E.2d 196, 197 (1952); Fleming v. Carolina Power & 
Light Co., 229 N.C. 397, 402, 50 S.E.2d 45, 48 (1948), modified, 230 N.C. 65, 51 S.E.2d 898 
(1949). In North Carolina’s jurisprudence surrounding the immediate appealability of 
motions to strike, Dunlop represents one of two divergent case law trends. One line of 
cases suggests that courts would not sustain motions to strike for fear of charting the path 
of the trial beforehand, while the other line of cases, which includes Dunlop, applied a test 
for relevancy that found pleadings irrelevant if the pleader had no right to assert the claim 
or defense. See Henry Brandis, Jr. & Willis C. Bumgarner, The Motion to Strike Pleadings 
in North Carolina, 29 N.C. L. REV. 3, 6–7 (1950); see also Dunlop, 214 N.C. at 198, 198 S.E. 
at 646. 
 99. See Biggs v. Lassiter, 220 N.C. 761, 772, 18 S.E.2d 419, 425 (1942); Smith v. Childs, 
112 N.C. App. 672, 684–85, 437 S.E.2d 500, 508–09 (1993); Chem. Bank v. Belk, 41 N.C. 
App. 356, 368–69, 255 S.E.2d 421, 429 (1979). 
 100. See Biggs, 220 N.C. at 772–73, 18 S.E.2d at 425 (distinguishing Dunlop, which 
involved a nonjudicial foreclosure pursuant to the FMVOD, from this case). 
 101. See Smith, 112 N.C. App. at 684–85, 437 S.E.2d at 508–09; Chem. Bank, 41 N.C. 
App. at 368–69, 255 S.E.2d at 429. 
 102. See, e.g., U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 (1977) (citing 
Richmond Mortgage, 300 U.S. 124, 128–29 (1937)) (using Richmond Mortgage as authority 
to overturn the repeal of a legislative bond program, which left no recourse for 
bondholders to recover the debt they were owed); Balt. Teachers Union, Am. Fed’n of 
Teachers Local 340 v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012, 1018 (4th Cir. 
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that certain acts of a legislature do not impair the obligation of 
contract so long as they leave alternative methods of recovery 
available to the lender.103 Moreover, in the handful of North Carolina 
cases that cite to the corresponding Supreme Court of North 
Carolina’s opinion in Richmond Mortgage, not a single one even 
mentions guarantors, let alone the application of that holding to 
guarantors’ liability,104 except in one instance.105 That outlier case did 
mention guarantors, but the case was principally about the 
relationship of the lender and borrower, as the interlocutory order 
that was appealed was the summary judgment regarding the amount 
of deficiency on the loan.106 
C. The Forgotten Jurisprudence’s Legacy: A New Interpretation of 
the FMVOD Statute by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
After Dunlop, there was a dearth of appellate litigation 
regarding the FMVOD for several decades, but a flurry of cases 
involving the FMVOD began in the late 1970s that would change 
anti-deficiency jurisprudence substantially.107 In numerous cases, in 
both state and federal courts, courts refused to apply the FMVOD to 
any party but the mortgagor and those with an interest in the 
property foreclosed.108 Each case approved an interpretation of 
section	45-21.36 that limited its application solely to parties with a 
property interest in the foreclosed property.109 
 
1993) (“[The Court] sustained in [Richmond Mortgage], for example, a state law that 
‘recognized the obligations of [the mortgagee’s] contract and his right to its full 
enforcement but limit[ed] that right so as to prevent his obtaining more than his due.’	”). 
 103. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 19; Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1018. 
 104. See Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Sanders, 264 N.C. 234, 244, 141 S.E.2d 329, 336 
(1965) (dealing with an untimely attempted injunction of a nonjudicial foreclosure 
pursuant to section 45-21.34); Brumley v. Baxter, 225 N.C. 691, 698, 36 S.E.2d 281, 286 
(1945) (citing Richmond Mortgage as one of eight cases that illustrate the rule that 
legislatures may alter contracts “where the motivation is for a public purpose and in the 
public interest, and does not confer exclusive privilege”); Biggs, 220 N.C. at 772, 18 S.E.2d 
at 425 (discussing the application of Dunlop and Richmond Mortgage to the 1939 
deficiency judgment legislation); Tarboro Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Bell, 210 N.C. 35, 36, 185 
S.E. 486, 486 (1936) (affirming a straightforward application of chapter 275 of the 1933 law 
to a borrower).  
 105. See Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Hous., Inc., 292 N.C. 93, 111–12, 232 S.E.2d 667, 
678–79 (1977). 
 106. See id. at 98–99, 232 S.E.2d at 671 (“The Superior Court was clearly in error in 
rendering summary judgment for a specified amount, the alleged unpaid balance due upon 
the note, while retaining for hearing and determination the claim of [the borrower], that it 
is entitled to a set-off or credit in approximately the same amount.”). 
 107. See infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.  
 108. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.  
 109. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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The first case to hold such a limited view of the FMVOD was 
First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Martin,110 which began as an action 
to recover a deficiency after a bank foreclosed a deed of trust 
securing a promissory note signed by a husband and wife.111 More 
specifically, the issue was whether a one-year statute of limitations for 
deficiency judgments112 applied to the defendant couple.113 In holding 
that the statute of limitations did not apply to non-mortgagors, the 
Court of Appeals North Carolina presented the FMVOD statute as 
an example of how the North Carolina General Assembly intended 
protection of anti-deficiency statutes to apply only to mortgagors.114 
This case marked the first real instance where a North Carolina court 
interpreted to whom the FMVOD applies: “[f]rom this Act it seems 
clear that the General Assembly intended to limit protection to those 
persons who held a property interest in the mortgaged property and 
that such protection was not applicable to other parties liable on the 
underlying debt.”115 
Notably, the Supreme Court of North Carolina declined to 
review the case and therefore seemingly did not dispute the court of 
appeals’ interpretation of the FMVOD.116 Further, on several other 
occasions, the Supreme Court of North Carolina refused to correct 
the record regarding the proper application of Dunlop.117 The 
numerous instances in which the court declined to correct these 
decisions led lenders to believe that they would be able to pursue 
guarantors for the deficient amount post-foreclosure without being 
subject to the FMVOD.118 
 
 110. 44 N.C. App. 261, 261 S.E.2d 145 (1979), disc. rev. denied, 299 N.C. 741, 267 S.E.2d 
661 (1980). 
 111. Id. at 261, 261 S.E.2d at 146–47. 
 112. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	1-54(6) (2016) (prohibiting deficiency judgments one year after 
the foreclosure of a security interest). 
 113. First Citizens, 44 N.C. App. at 262, 261 S.E.2d at 147. 
 114. See id. at 263–64, 261 S.E.2d at 148. 
 115. Id. at 264, 261 S.E.2d at 148 (emphasis added). 
 116. See First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Martin, 299 N.C. 741, 741, 267 S.E.2d 661, 661 
(1980) (mem.). 
 117. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 118. See, e.g., Biggs v. Lassiter, 220 N.C. 761, 772, 18 S.E.2d 419, 425 (1942); Smith v. 
Childs, 112 N.C. App. 672, 684–85, 437 S.E.2d 500, 508–09 (1993); Chem. Bank v. Belk, 41 
N.C. App. 356, 368–69, 255 S.E.2d 421, 429 (1979); see also supra notes 98–101 and 
accompanying text. This was an argument of the North Carolina Bankers’ Association in 
its amicus brief filed for the High Point Bank case. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the N.C. 
Bankers’ Ass’n to the N.C. Court of Appeals at 15–16, High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. 
Highmark Props., LLC, 231 N.C. App. 31, 750 S.E.2d 886 (2013) (No. COA13-331), 2013 
WL 2389946, at *15–16 (arguing that changing the court of appeals line of precedent 
“would disturb decades of settled law regarding the freedom of contract” and would 
negatively impact lending practices going forward).  
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For example, in American Foods, Inc. v. Goodson Farms, Inc.,119 
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, applying First Citizens, 
refused to extend protection of the FMVOD to co-makers of a 
promissory note because they did not have an ownership interest in 
the property that was foreclosed.120 Moreover, the court declined to 
afford them equitable protection simply because their corporation 
could assert the defense, as it would “pierce the corporate veil in a 
unique way”—by “wrap[ping] the corporate cloak of Lewis Nursery, 
Inc., around [the co-maker], since [defendant] financed the 
corporation, and conclud[ing] that he and Goodson Farms had an 
equitable interest in the lands[.]”121 Having lost on appeal, the 
defendants petitioned for discretionary review, specifically for review 
of the issue addressed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals’ 
dissenting opinion.122 The dissent mostly addressed whether there was 
a genuine issue of material fact about the impact of a joint venture 
agreement on a defendant’s counterclaim.123 Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina limited review solely to the trial court’s 
dismissal of the counterclaim.124 In a brief opinion, it affirmed the 
court of appeals’ ruling, holding that “its reasoning and the legal 
principles enunciated by it, are correct[,]” and adopted the majority 
opinion as its own.125 
Based on this opinion by the highest state court, most lenders 
(and their attorneys) seemingly concluded that the limitation of the 
FMVOD applying it to mortgagors only, as first enunciated in First 
Citizens and reiterated here, was adopted by the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina. Although the court did not set precedent itself by 
denying discretionary review of the entire case and limiting review to 
the issue raised by the dissent, it effectively did so by default. The 
holding of First Citizens remained binding precedent in North 
Carolina following the partial denial of review; moreover, the pattern 
 
 119. 50 N.C. App. 591, 275 S.E.2d 184 (1981), aff’d per curiam, 304 N.C. 386, 283 
S.E.2d 517 (1981). 
 120. Id. at 596–97, 275 S.E.2d at 187–88. 
 121. Id. at 597, 275 S.E.2d at 188. 
 122. See Am. Foods, Inc. v. Goodson Farms, Inc., 280 S.E.2d 459, 459 (N.C. 1981) 
(mem.). 
 123. See Am. Foods, 50 N.C. App. at 600, 275 S.E.2d at 189 (Wells, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (dissenting only as to the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact about the impact of a joint venture agreement on a counterclaim by the 
defendant). 
 124. See Am. Foods, 280 S.E.2d at 459 (denying appeal of entire case, and allowing 
appeal based on Wells’s dissent). 
 125. Am. Foods, Inc. v. Goodson Farms, Inc., 304 N.C. 386, 387, 283 S.E.2d 517, 517 
(1981) (per curiam) (mem.). 
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of denials of review and the adoption of an opinion approving the 
appellate court’s interpretation of the FMVOD statute clearly 
allowed and encouraged other North Carolina courts to apply this 
same interpretation. Indeed, that pattern of passive acceptance by the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina led the Court of Appeals North 
Carolina to continue applying its strict interpretation of the FMVOD 
statute leading up to High Point Bank.126 Similarly, First Citizens 
ostensibly allowed and encouraged lenders to continue with this 
particular method of post-default collection, as it affirmed the 
practice of lenders obtaining deficiencies against guarantors without 
fearing the assertion of the FMVOD. 
Following the decades of precedent set by North Carolina 
appellate courts and reiterated in decisions by federal courts,127 the 
strict application of the FMVOD to those with property interests in 
foreclosed collateral became well-settled law.128 And yet, the absence 
 
 126. See NCNB Nat’l Bank of N.C. v. O’Neill, 102 N.C. App. 313, 316, 401 S.E.2d 858, 
860 (1991) (“The General Assembly clearly intended to limit the protection of [section 45-
21.36] to those who hold a property interest in the mortgaged property.”); Raleigh Fed. 
Sav. Bank v. Godwin, 99 N.C. App. 761, 763, 394 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1990) (“The General 
Assembly’s intention to limit the protection of the statute to those who hold a property 
interest in the mortgaged property is clear; the protection of G.S. §	45-21.36 is not 
applicable to other parties who may be liable on the underlying debt.”); Borg-Warner 
Acceptance Corp. v. Johnston, 97 N.C. App. 575, 580, 389 S.E.2d 429, 432 (1990), disc. 
review denied, 333 N.C. 254, 424 S.E.2d 918 (1993) (“Defendants, as guarantors	.	.	.	hold no 
property interest	.	.	.	and therefore may not assert the defense contained in G.S. §	45-
21.36.”); Nw. Bank v. Weston, 73 N.C. App. 162, 164, 325 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1985) (holding 
that the use of “the” rather than “an” to modify “obligation” demonstrates that the North 
Carolina General Assembly intended section 45-21.36 to apply to the “obligation secured 
by the property for sale”).  
  Of particular interest to this Comment is Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. 
Johnston—another instance in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina refused to 
grant discretionary review and writ of certiorari to set the record straight on how the 
FMVOD applies to guarantors. Borg-Warner, 333 N.C. at 254, 424 S.E.2d at 918. The 
Court of Appeals of North Carolina wrote an opinion that provided a straightforward 
application of First Citizens and American Foods to guarantors attempting to assert the 
FMVOD. See Borg-Warner, 97 N.C. App. at 575, 389 S.E.2d at 429. The opinion 
emphasized that the statute was intended to apply to mortgagors only, and, because the 
title of the foreclosed property was in the name of the guarantors’ corporation, the Court 
of Appeals of North Carolina refused to allow them the protections contained in the 
FMVOD. See id. at 579–80, 389 S.E.2d at 432. 
 127. See, e.g., Poughkeepsie Sav. Bank, FSB v. Harris, 833 F. Supp. 551, 554–55 
(W.D.N.C. 1993) (holding the FMVOD inapplicable to guarantors that had property 
interests since they did not own the property in their capacity as guarantors); supra note 
126 and accompanying text. 
 128. See 2-13 WEBSTER’S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA: POSSESSORY 
ESTATES AND PRESENT INTERESTS IN REAL PROPERTY §	13.47 (Patrick K. Hetrick, 
James B. McLaughlin & Michael B. Kent, Jr. eds., 6th ed. 2016) (“Based on this language, 
several decisions have indicated that the protections of N.C. Gen. Stat. §	45-21.36 apply 
only to those persons who hold a property interest in the mortgage property. For this 
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of references to Dunlop left questions seemingly forgotten by the 
collective legal memory: Had the court forgotten its discussion in 
Dunlop? Did it ever plan to resurrect that reasoning in light of a 
generation of well-reasoned, undisturbed Court of Appeals of North 
Carolina holdings to the contrary? The holdings of the past 
generation rendered the Dunlop dicta almost certainly forgotten 
reasoning with respect to its discussion of the FMVOD, in part due to 
the actions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 
The court’s support for the narrow interpretation of the 
FMVOD statute was both implicit and explicit. Not only did the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina implicitly accept the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals’ restriction of the FMVOD to the express 
terms of the statute by its failure to address the issue upon 
discretionary review,129 but the court also lent its own authority to 
that interpretation of the statute in affirming and adopting the 
opinion in American Foods.130 However, the failure of North 
Carolina’s judiciary to clarify the application of the FMVOD to 
guarantors beyond the pleading stage precipitated the paradigm shift 
that High Point Bank instituted.131 The following Part examines High 
Point Bank, the case that caused this change, and seeks to explain 
how the Supreme Court of North Carolina carried the forgotten 
jurisprudence of Dunlop and Richmond Mortgage forward to the 
modern day. This change had drastic consequences for lenders 
pursuing a strategy of nonjudicially foreclosing first and seeking 
deficiencies later.132 
III.  HIGH POINT BANK: REVIVING FORGOTTEN JURISPRUDENCE 
North Carolina’s judiciary finally reached the questions raised by 
the conflicting histories described in Part II in High Point Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Highmark Properties, LLC.133 The following discussions 
trace the development of this seminal case beginning with the 
 
reason, numerous decisions also have held that a guarantor cannot claim the benefits of 
the statute.”). 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 116–18. 
 130. See Am. Foods, Inc. v. Goodson Farms, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 591, 596–97, 275 S.E.2d 
184, 187–88, aff’d per curiam, 304 N.C. 386, 283 S.E.2d 517 (1981); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 121–26. 
 131. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
 132. See, e.g., Poughkeepsie, 833 F. Supp. at 554–55 (holding that defendants who were 
both guarantors and property owners could not raise the setoff defense after defaulting on 
their note). 
 133. 231 N.C. App. 31, 750 S.E.2d 886 (2013), aff’d as modified, 368 N.C. 301, 776 
S.E.2d 838 (2015). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 857 (2017) 
2017] GUARANTOR LIABILITY 881 
commercial lending transaction, the subsequent default, and the trial 
court proceedings. Analysis continues by introducing the Court of 
Appeals of North Carolina’s majority and concurring opinions, which 
established the modern application of both Dunlop’s and Richmond 
Mortgage’s forgotten jurisprudence. Finally, this Part culminates in 
discussion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s opinion that 
cemented the application of this forgotten jurisprudence in North 
Carolina law. 
A. Facts and Trial Court Proceedings 
High Point Bank involved a $6,450,000 loan made through two 
promissory notes held by Highmark Properties, LLC (“the 
Borrower”), secured by two different properties by deeds of trust.134 
At the same time, High Point Bank also executed “commercial 
guaranty” agreements with the four co-owners of Highmark 
Properties.135 The four co-owners formed Highmark Properties as a 
closely held real estate development venture—a line of business that 
organically grew from their collective prior experiences.136 Together, 
they had over eighty years of experience in banking, construction, 
real estate, and business management.137 In particular, one of the co-
owners had experience as a real estate loan processor; he worked as a 
lending compliance officer for BB&T at the time these guaranty 
agreements were made.138 Therefore, the experience that these 
owners brought to the table as savvy business people likely gave them 
the ability to fully understand and appreciate the weighty 
consequences of signing a commercial guaranty agreement.  
The language of the guaranty agreements created a guaranty of 
payment,139 allowing the bank to pursue the guarantors directly upon 
default of the borrower.140 Additionally, the guaranties waived “any 
 
 134. Id. at 32, 750 S.E.2d at 887. 
 135. Id. at 32–33, 750 S.E.2d at 887. 
 136. See Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. 
Highmark Properties, LLC, 231 N.C. App. 31, 750 S.E.2d 886 (2013) (No. COA13-331), 
2013 WL 4498102, at *2. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See 5-44 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 28, §	44.03[3][b][i] (defining 
“guaranty of payment”). 
 140. See Transcript of Record on Appeal at 17, 20, High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. 
Highmark Properties, LLC, 231 N.C. App. 31, 750 S.E.2d 886 (2013) (No. COA13-331). 
The agreement read: 
For good and valuable consideration, Guarantor absolutely and unconditionally 
guarantees full and punctual payment and satisfaction of the Indebtedness of 
Borrower to Lender	.	.	.	. This is a guaranty of payment and performance and not 
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rights or defenses arising by reason of	.	.	.	any	.	.	.	anti-deficiency law 
or any other law which may prevent [the bank] from bringing any 
action, including a claim for deficiency, against Guarantor, before or 
after” judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure.141 Finally, the guarantors 
agreed in the guaranty “not to assert or claim at any time any 
deductions to the amount guaranteed under [the] Guaranty for any 
claim of setoff	.	.	.	whether such claim, demand or right may be 
asserted by the Borrower, the Guarantor, or both.”142 With their 
signatures, the guarantors acknowledged that they were agreeing 
“with	.	.	.	full knowledge of [the] significance and consequences” of 
the guaranty.143 
After paying over $1.5 million on the loans and receiving the 
benefit of an extension of the repayment period, the borrower 
ultimately defaulted in early fall 2010.144 The bank then demanded 
immediate repayment and commenced a proceeding against the 
borrower and the guarantors to recover the $4.5 million of 
outstanding debt.145 While this action was pending, on February 8, 
2011, the bank foreclosed on the properties securing the notes under 
the power of sale contained in the agreements.146 As the sole bidder, 
the bank purchased the properties for almost $3.3 million, leaving a 
remaining indebtedness on the notes worth $1,579,842.147 In arguing 
the deficiency owed by the parties post-foreclosure, both the 
borrower and the guarantor asserted the FMVOD as an affirmative 
defense.148 The bank argued that while the borrower would be 
entitled to assert the FMVOD, the guarantors should not be allowed 
to assert it in their capacity as guarantors, nor obtain the benefit of 
 
of collection, so Lender can enforce this Guaranty against Guarantor even when 
Lender has not exhausted Lender’s remedies against anyone else obligated to pay 
the Indebtedness or against any collateral securing the Indebtedness	.	.	.	. 
Guarantor will make any payments to Lender	.	.	.	in same-day funds, without set-
off or deduction or counterclaim, and will otherwise perform Borrower’s 
obligations under the Note and Related Documents.  
Id.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 18–19, 21–22. 
 144. See High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 231 N.C. App. 31, 33, 
750 S.E.2d 886, 887 (2013), aff’d as modified, 368 N.C. 301, 776 S.E.2d 838 (2015). 
 145. See id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See High Point Bank & Tr. Co v. Highmark Props., LLC, 368 N.C. 301, 302–03, 
776 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2015). 
 148. See id. at 303, 776 S.E.2d at 840.  
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the borrower’s assertion.149 The bank subsequently moved for 
summary judgment and ultimately voluntarily dismissed all claims 
against Highmark Properties without prejudice.150 
Yet, approximately a month later, the guarantors rejoined the 
borrowers pursuant to section 26-12 of the North Carolina General 
Statutes, a statute permitting “joinder of debtor by surety[.]”151 This 
joinder of Highmark Properties was due largely to the parties’ dispute 
over whether the guarantors could benefit from the FMVOD.152 The 
bank filed a motion in limine arguing that the FMVOD was 
unavailable to guarantors because the bank voluntarily dismissed its 
claims against the borrower permitted to assert the FMVOD.153 After 
oral argument, the trial court “[held] in its discretion” that 
guarantors’ joinder of Highmark Properties was proper under section 
26-12 of the North Carolina General Statutes, Rule 19 of the North 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure requiring joinder of necessary 
parties, or Rule 20 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 
allowing joinder of permissive parties.154 Following precedent, the 
trial court entered summary judgment against the guarantors with 
respect to their liability for the remaining debt, leaving the “value of 
the property securing payment of the Notes and its effect, if any, on 
the deficiency owed” for further determination by the jury.155 
At the trial on the sole remaining issue of the deficient amount, 
the jury heard from appraisal experts offered by both the plaintiff and 
the defendants.156 Ultimately, the jury determined that the fair market 
value of the property foreclosed upon by the bank was worth far 
 
 149. See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at 10, High Point Bank & Tr. Co v. Highmark 
Props., LLC, 231 N.C. App. 31, 750 S.E.2d 886 (2013) (No. COA13-331), 2013 WL 
2389945, at *10.  
 150. High Point Bank, 368 N.C. at 302, 776 S.E.2d at 840. 
 151. See id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §	26-12 (2016). 
 152. See High Point Bank, 368 N.C. at 302–03, 776 S.E.2d at 840. The guarantors also 
argued that the borrower was a necessary party pursuant to Rule 19 of the North Carolina 
Rules of Civil Procedure or a permissive party that should be joined pursuant to Rule 20 
of the same. Id. 
 153. See Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine at 2, High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark 
Props., LLC, No. 10-CVS-10910, 2011 WL 11577616 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2011).  
 154. Order at *1, High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, No. 10-CVS-
10910, 2011 WL 11571959 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2011). See generally N.C. R. CIV. P. 
19–20 (2015) (setting out rules for necessary and permissive joinder). 
 155. High Point Bank, 368 N.C. at 303, 776 S.E.2d at 840; see Order at *1, High Point 
Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, No. 10-CVS-10910, 2011 WL 11571956 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2011).  
 156. Record on Appeal at 99–103, High Point Bank & Tr. Co v. Highmark Props., 
LLC, 231 N.C. App. 31, 750 S.E.2d 886 (2013) (No. COA13-331) (encompassing plaintiff’s 
and defendants’ witness and exhibits lists, which respectively included appraisal experts 
for both parties and appraisal reports by both parties’ experts).  
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more than the bank credit bid at the nonjudicial sale.157 The jurors 
reduced the $1.5 million amount of remaining indebtedness by the 
fair market value of the foreclosed properties—a reduction that left 
the borrower and guarantors “jointly and severally liable” for only 
$302,556.158 
B. Court of Appeals of North Carolina Opinion 
The bank appealed to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina; 
upon review the court began its analysis by considering whether 
“reducing the liability of Guarantors based upon [the FMVOD] was 
improper.”159 At the outset, the court noted that guarantors are liable 
for the deficiency of borrowers; it stated that guarantors “stand[] in 
the shoes of the debtor with respect to liability[.]”160 The court then 
examined the application of joinder pursuant to section 26-12 of the 
North Carolina General Statutes.161 It interpreted that statute as 
permissive with respect to joining parties and thus within the trial 
judge’s discretion.162 Accordingly, only a showing that the trial judge 
had abused his discretion would lead the court to overturn the joinder 
of the borrower by the guarantors.163 The majority applied Richmond 
Mortgage to affirm the holding of the trial court, declaring that, after 
the borrower was joined, it “was entitled to assert” the FMVOD, and 
that such an assertion served to reduce the amount of overall 
indebtedness, rather than the personal liability of the borrower.164 
Based on this reasoning, the court allowed the guarantors to benefit 
 
 157. Id. at 104 (including jury’s finding that amount bid by plaintiff on February 8, 
2011, was substantially less than the fair market value of the property). The jury found one 
property to be worth $3,723,000 and the other to be worth $1,034,000. Id. at 104–05. 
 158. Id. at 109; see High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 231 N.C. 
App. 31, 34, 750 S.E.2d 886, 888 (2013), aff’d as modified, 368 N.C. 301, 776 S.E.2d 838 
(2015). 
 159. High Point Bank, 231 N.C. App. at 35, 750 S.E.2d at 888–89. The opinion also 
discussed the lower court’s joinder issues, id. at 35–36, 750 S.E.2d at 889, which are outside 
the scope of this Comment. 
 160. Id. at 35, 750 S.E.2d at 889 (quoting Gregory Poole Equip. Co. v. Murray, 105 
N.C. App. 642, 646, 414 S.E.2d 563, 566 (1992)). 
 161. Id. at 35–36, 750 S.E.2d at 889.  
 162. Id. at 35, 750 S.E.2d at 889 (“So long as Plaintiff was subject to the jurisdiction of 
the trial court, and that is not disputed in this case, the trial court’s joinder of Plaintiff 
upon Guarantors’ request was discretionary.”). 
 163. Id. (“[A] discretionary order of the trial court is conclusive on appeal absent a 
showing of abuse of discretion.”) (quoting Brock & Scott Holdings, Inc. v. Stone, 203 N.C. 
App 135, 137, 691 S.E.2d 37, 38–39 (2010))). 
 164. Id. at 36, 750 S.E.2d at 889. 
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from the borrower’s reliance on the FMVOD and reduce their 
liability.165 
Notably, the majority “quite assiduously avoided making” a 
determination of whether the guarantor could “personally assert an 
offset defense pursuant to [the FMVOD].”166 Nevertheless, the 
majority proceeded to ponder whether it would be reasonable to 
allow a guarantor to assert the FMVOD personally and separately 
from the borrower’s own assertion, much in the same manner the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina pondered the same issue in 
Dunlop.167 This dicta analogized the FMVOD statute to section 45-
21.38 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which prohibits 
deficiency suits based on purchase money mortgages, suggesting that 
the FMVOD could be asserted by the guarantors themselves due to 
the dicta in Dunlop, which the Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
had previously held to apply to that statute.168 Ultimately, this dicta 
served as an interlude to the true focus and holding of the majority 
opinion in High Point Bank, that “once Borrower successfully 
obtained an offset pursuant to [the FMVOD statute], reducing 
Borrower’s indebtedness thereby, Guarantors could only be held 
responsible for Borrower’s indebtedness.”169 
Judge Dillon wrote a separate opinion concurring in part.170 He 
concurred with the majority’s holding that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by permitting joinder of the borrower by the 
guarantors;171 however, he wrote separately to clarify his thoughts on 
what he considered to be the proper application of the FMVOD 
statute to guarantors.172 This concurrence can be characterized as 
proceeding in two parts: the former discussing Court of Appeals of 
North Carolina precedent and its application173 and the latter 
explaining how the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s opinion in 
Dunlop discredits the court of appeals’ precedent.174 
Judge Dillon noted that the court of appeals’ precedent holds 
that the FMVOD is not available to guarantors directly, and he laid 
out a syllogism by which the FMVOD statute can be understood: the 
 
 165. See id. at 36–37, 750 S.E.2d at 889–90. 
 166. Id. at 38, 750 S.E.2d at 890. 
 167. See id. at 38–39, 750 S.E.2d at 891.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 39, 750 S.E.2d at 891.  
 170. See id. (Dillon, J., concurring). 
 171. See id. at 40, 750 S.E.2d at 891. 
 172. Id. at 40, 750 S.E.2d at 891–92.  
 173. See id. at 40–41, 750 S.E.2d at 891–93.  
 174. See id. at 42–43, 750 S.E.2d at 893–94.  
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“general rule” is that indebtedness is reduced by the amount bid at 
foreclosure, yet, “[t]his general rule is abrogated in situations where 
the creditor, who commenced the foreclosure, is the high bidder at 
the foreclosure sale.”175 The availability of the FMVOD to the 
guarantor, then, depends on whether the FMVOD, as the exception 
to the general rule, applies to the “mortgagor-borrower’s personal 
liability to pay the indebtedness” or to the actual indebtedness 
itself.176 Ergo, if the FMVOD applies to the borrower’s liability, then 
it is unavailable to the guarantor. If the FMVOD applies to the 
indebtedness itself, then it is available to the guarantor after a 
borrower’s successful assertion. Indeed, Judge Dillon’s emphasis on 
the borrower’s liability in his concurrence appeared to signal two 
points: first, that this juxtaposition may be the exact reason why Judge 
Dillon wrote separately—to encourage the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina to clarify the case law, especially with regards to Dunlop; 
and second, to suggest that he believes the FMVOD should be 
personal to the borrower. In a footnote, he cited two scenarios in 
which a defense is personal to the borrower to the exclusion of the 
guarantor, including when a borrower’s discharge of the debt in 
bankruptcy does not benefit the guarantor and when the borrower is 
“an idiot or an infant[,]” or a company “acting ultra vires[.]”177 
As further evidence of the guarantor’s inability to assert the 
FMVOD, Judge Dillon cited four separate cases in which the Court 
of Appeals of North Carolina held that the FMVOD statute solely 
applies to parties with a property interest in the foreclosed 
collateral.178 According to Judge Dillon, “Taken together, these 
holdings from our Court discussed above suggest that the defense 
provided by [the FMVOD statute] is personal to the mortgagor-
borrower.”179 
Despite the considerable court of appeals precedent, Judge 
Dillon also recognized that Dunlop offered possible conflicting 
precedent that could not be overturned without a different Supreme 
 
 175. Id. at 40, 750 S.E.2d at 892. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 40 n.2, 750 S.E.2d at 892 n.2 (quoting Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 10 
N.C. App. 70, 74, 178 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1970)).  
 178. See id. at 41, 750 S.E.2d at 892–93 (citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Arlington 
Hills of Mint Hill, LLC, 226 N.C. App. 174, 178, 742 S.E.2d 201, 204 (2013); Raleigh Fed. 
Sav. Bank v. Godwin, 99 N.C. App. 761, 763, 394 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1990); Borg-Warner 
Acceptance Corp. v. Johnston, 97 N.C. App. 575, 579, 389 S.E.2d 429, 433 (1990); First 
Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Martin, 44 N.C. App. 261, 261 S.E.2d 145 (1979) disc. rev. 
denied, 299 N.C. 741, 267 S.E.2d 661 (1980)).  
 179. Id. at 41, 750 S.E.2d at 893. 
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Court of North Carolina opinion to the contrary.180 He noted that the 
four Court of Appeals North Carolina cases he cited failed to 
reference Dunlop and then continued by explaining how that opinion 
might lend support for guarantors asserting the FMVOD beyond the 
pleading stage, reasoning, 
If the defense was not available to a guarantor under the 
statute, the allegations would have been irrelevant to the 
resolution of the creditor’s action against the guarantor; and I 
believe the Supreme Court would have been compelled to 
reverse the trial court’s ruling, which would have prevented the 
parties from wasting time and resources at trial presenting 
evidence to prove irrelevant issues.181 
In other words, because the court permitted the guarantor to assert 
the FMVOD at the pleading stage, the guarantor was able to take full 
advantage of the statute beyond the pleading because it otherwise 
would have been a waste of precious judicial resources. 
To reiterate, both the majority opinion and the concurrence 
recognized that Dunlop signified that the Court of Appeals of North 
Carolina should permit the guarantor to benefit from the borrower’s 
assertion of the FMVOD.182 Yet the concurrence highlighted the 
discordant case law that existed in North Carolina’s jurisprudence 
surrounding the FMVOD statute.183 This disharmony begged for 
relief by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which eventually 
provided such relief when it granted discretionary review the 
following year.184 
C. Supreme Court of North Carolina Opinion 
The desired relief was finally granted when the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina affirmed the majority ruling in a landmark opinion 
for post-foreclosure deficiency judgments, and in so doing, 
strengthened the FMVOD and broadened the class of obligors that it 
benefits.185 The court’s opinion has opened up the potential for the 
 
 180. Id. at 41–42, 750 S.E.2d at 892–93 (citing Va. Tr. Co. v. Dunlop, 214 N.C. 196, 198 
S.E. 645 (1938)). 
 181. Id. at 42–43, 750 S.E.2d at 893–94.  
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 167–68, 180–80.  
 183. See supra text accompanying notes 173–81.  
 184. See High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 367 N.C. 321, 321, 755 
S.E.2d 627, 627 (2014) (mem.).  
 185. See High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 368 N.C. 301, 309, 776 
S.E.2d 838, 844 (2015). 
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topsy-turvy world wherein guarantors might become de facto primary 
obligors. 
On de novo review, the opinion began by claiming that the court 
had “previously	.	.	.	addressed the essence” of the arguments 
presented and “held a guarantor is within the group of those who 
enjoy the protection of [the FMVOD].”186 The court supported this 
previously undisclosed holding of the FMVOD’s applicability to 
guarantors by citing a 1977 case,187 Wachovia Realty Investments v. 
Housing, Inc.188 After citing this case, the court described the 
FMVOD as “not a ‘defense’ in the usual sense which can be 
waived[,]” but rather, as “an equitable method of calculating the 
indebtedness.”189 
In addition to citing its prior holdings that guarantors could 
“enjoy the protection” of the FMVOD, the court noted that the 
historical context in which the FMVOD statute was adopted 
“	‘compelled [the court] to construe [such a] statute more broadly’ to 
ensure the legislative purposes are fulfilled.”190 In a footnote, the 
court provided further insight into what exactly these legislative 
purposes might have been by citing the “particularly helpful” Currie 
and Lieberman article, which the court cited in a prior decision 
interpreting section 45-21.38 of the North Carolina General 
Statutes.191 The footnote quoted that article to support the notion that 
the FMVOD statute “was the first in a series of legislative attempts at 
the same session to deal with the mortgage problem[,]”192 and the 
court reiterated the article’s conclusion that, by enacting the FMVOD 
statute, the legislature “intended to protect vendees from oppression 
by vendors and mortgagors from oppression by mortgagees.”193 In so 
doing, the court appeared to engage in its own method of statutory 
interpretation beyond the confines of the FMVOD statute’s text and 
 
 186. Id. at 304, 776 S.E.2d at 841. 
 187. Id. at 304–05, 776 S.E.2d at 841 (citing Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Hous., Inc., 292 
N.C. 93, 112, 232 S.E.2d 667, 679 (1977)). 
 188. 292 N.C. 93, 112, 232 S.E.2d 667, 679 (1977) (citing Richmond Mortg. & Loan 
Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., 210 N.C. 29, 34, 185 S.E 482, 485 (1936), aff’d, 300 U.S. 
124 (1937)).  
 189. High Point Bank, 368 N.C. at 305, 776 S.E.2d at 841. 
 190. Id. at 304–05, 776 S.E.2d at 841–42 (second alteration in original) (quoting Ross 
Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., 296 N.C. 366, 373, 250 S.E.2d 271, 275 (1979)). 
 191. Id. at 305–06 n.1, 776 S.E.2d at 842 n.1 (citing Currie & Lieberman, supra note 59, 
at 11); see Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., 296 N.C. 366, 370–71, 250 
S.E.2d 271, 273–74 (1979). 
 192. High Point Bank, 368 N.C. at 306 n.1, 776 S.E.2d at 842 n.1 (quoting Ross Realty, 
296 N.C. at 370–71, 250 S.E.2d at 273–74); see Currie & Lieberman, supra note 59, at 11.  
 193. Id. (quoting Ross Realty, 296 N.C. at 371, 250 S.E.2d at 274.  
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based instead on the history of the statute. Perhaps because of the 
lack of statutory history available, the court also seemed to show it 
was willing to interpret the FMVOD as being much broader than the 
text might otherwise provide.194 Simply put, the court deviated from a 
textual analysis of the statute in the absence of legislative history.  
Those factors were not the only grounds for the court’s 
willingness to grant the guarantors the FMVOD’s protection. The 
court continued by discussing the forgotten jurisprudence of Dunlop 
and Richmond Mortgage; it distilled the Dunlop holding to the 
concept that a guarantor could raise the FMVOD in his own right, 
wholly quoting the equivocating language of that opinion in 
support.195 Yet this distillation was not as pure as it might seem. 
Rather than addressing the equivocating language of that decision, 
the court merely omitted any troubling language, labeling what 
appeared to be dicta as the central reasoning of Dunlop and removing 
the language stating “[i]t might be contended, with reason, that	.	.	.” 
from the preceding clause.196 Consequently, the court 
mischaracterized the puzzling dicta of Dunlop as assured, settled 
precedent. Moreover, the court ignored the procedural posture of 
that case. Instead of describing the holding in Dunlop as allowing the 
guarantor to plead the FMVOD, the court declared that, in Dunlop, 
“we concluded that the guarantor	.	.	.	had the right to utilize the 
statutory protection at trial.”197 
Building on its analysis of Dunlop, the court confirmed 
Richmond Mortgage’s holding that the FMVOD statute was not 
meant to create a defense per se.198 Instead, the FMVOD statute 
“protects a debtor by calculating the debt based upon the fair market 
value of the collateral” rather than the foreclosure sale bid.199 This 
 
 194. See supra Section II.A.  
 195. High Point Bank, 368 N.C. at 306, 776 S.E.2d at 842 (citing Va. Tr. Co. v. Dunlop, 
214 N.C. 196, 198–99, 198 S.E. 645, 646 (1938)). 
 196. Compare Va. Tr. Co. v. Dunlop, 214 N.C. 196, 198, 198 S.E. 645, 646 (1938) (using 
equivocating, vague language), with High Point Bank, 368 N.C. at 306, 776 S.E.2d at 842 
(omitting equivocating language).  
 197. Compare Dunlop, 214 N.C. at 198–99, 198 S.E. at 646 (“It is not, of course, for us 
to say whether the defendants can make good the allegations of their further defense: We 
only say that at this stage of the case we do not deny their right to make it.” (emphasis 
added)), with High Point Bank, 368 N.C. at 306, 776 S.E.2d at 842 (“Consequently, we 
concluded that the guarantor, and thus the estate, had the right to utilize the statutory 
protection at trial.”).  
 198. High Point Bank, 368 N.C. at 307–08, 776 S.E.2d at 842–43 (citing Richmond 
Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., 210 N.C. 29, 34–35, 185 S.E. 482, 485 
(1936), aff’d, 300 U.S. 124 (1937)). 
 199. Id. at 307, 776 S.E.2d at 842–43. 
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interpretation led the court to state that the FMVOD contained 
therein was unwaivable.200 The enforcement of this precedent, in the 
court’s opinion, was controlling, and allowed a guarantor to have the 
FMVOD “equitable method of debt calculation” applied as a matter 
of right whenever a lender foreclosed by power of sale.201 
In characterizing the FMVOD as a method of debt calculation, 
the court explained that the offset derived from the borrower’s 
assertion of the FMVOD “is not the type of ‘defense or offset’ which 
is subject to waiver.”202 The court contrasted the opinion with another 
Supreme Court of North Carolina opinion decided less than a year 
prior, in which the court allowed waiver of Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act (“ECOA”) claims by guarantors.203 The distinguishing difference 
between these cases was the “form of claim” at issue.204 In the other 
case, RL REGI, N.C., LLC v. Lighthouse Cove, LLC,205 the 
guarantors sought recovery against a lender’s statutory violation, 
whereas the High Point Bank guarantors were “simply 
allow[ed]	.	.	.	the right to a judicial method of debt calculation[.]”206 
The difference between these two cases for the court, then, appears to 
be that Lighthouse Cove dealt with a statutory violation by the lender 
of the ECOA, while High Point Bank dealt with the newly extended 
statutory right of guarantors to ask for a judicial debt calculation. 
While the FMVOD was already deemed to be nonwaivable 
because it was an “equitable method of debt calculation[,]”207 the 
court took the non-waiver even further and held that although the 
guarantors signed a waiver of their rights under the FMVOD, any 
express waiver of the FMVOD is against public policy.208 In contrast 
to its former discussion of the FMVOD as broadly construed,209 the 
court somewhat ironically held that “because anti-deficiency 
legislation is so narrowly tailored to address specific instances of the 
public’s vulnerability to lender overreach, waiver of this statutory 
protection as a prerequisite to receipt of a mortgage or as a condition 
 
 200. Id. at 307, 776 S.E.2d at 843. 
 201. Id. at 307–08, 776 S.E.2d at 843. 
 202. Id. at 308, 776 S.E.2d at 843. 
 203. Id. (citing RL REGI N.C., LLC v. Lighthouse Cove, LLC, 367 N.C. 425, 430, 762 
S.E.2d 188, 191 (2014)). 
 204. Id. 
 205. 367 N.C. 425, 762 S.E.2d 188 (2014). 
 206. High Point Bank, 368 N.C. at 308, 776 S.E.2d at 843. 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id. 
 209. See supra text accompanying note 190. 
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of a guaranty agreement would violate public policy.”210 In its closing 
lines, the opinion returned to the facts and procedure of the foregoing 
proceedings, and it disagreed with the lender’s argument that section 
26-12 of the North Carolina General Statutes was inapplicable to the 
guarantors here.211 It held that joinder was entirely within the trial 
court’s discretion and that such discretion was not abused in this 
case.212 Accordingly, the lower court’s joinder of the borrower 
pursuant to section 26-12 was proper.213 
In light of the unsettled history of the FMVOD, this opinion is a 
game changer. Guarantors no longer need to wonder whether the 
FMVOD applies to them; in any scenario where the lender forecloses 
in a nonjudicial sale and purchases the property itself, the guarantors 
may benefit from a borrower’s assertion of the defense (or rather, the 
method of debt calculation) and maybe even assert the defense of 
their own accord. Also, lenders can no longer bargain to have 
guarantors waive such defenses. The FMVOD is now protected by a 
public policy rationale, having been granted a broad interpretation by 
the highest court in North Carolina, and the defense’s newfound basis 
in equitable principles allows guarantors to assert it as a matter of 
right regardless of any waivers.214 In light of this decision, “FMVOD” 
is now somewhat of a misnomer. Perhaps the FMVOD is better 
abbreviated as the “FMVOEMODC”—the “fair market value offset 
equitable method of debt calculation.”215 
IV.  WAS THE HIGH POINT BANK DECISION WRONG? 
Of course, an opinion like High Point Bank—with such far-
reaching consequences—is not without its flaws or counterarguments. 
The remainder of this Comment discusses the consequences of the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina’s opinion in High Point Bank. This 
Part attempts to explain the reasoning behind the decision in two 
ways: first, by explaining the overlooked textual analysis that the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina omitted from its opinion; and 
second, by attempting to explicate the reasoning of that court despite 
this flaw. Parts V and VI then illustrate the ways in which lenders 
 
 210. High Point Bank, 368 N.C. at 308, 776 S.E.2d at 843 (emphasis added). 
 211. Id. at 308–09, 776 S.E.2d at 843–44.  
 212. Id. at 309, 776 S.E.2d at 844. 
 213. Id.  
 214. See id. at 307–08, 776 S.E.2d at 843.  
 215. While this renaming of this Comment’s beloved FMVOD would indeed be 
appropriate at this juncture, this Comment will continue with the FMVOD nomenclature. 
Still, the point remains. 
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might respond to the decision and offer some legislative and judicial 
solutions to the consequences of High Point Bank. 
A. Interpreting the Language of the FMVOD Statute 
One of the weaknesses of the High Point Bank opinion is the 
court’s refusal to discuss the FMVOD as it was written. The court 
instead extrapolated the statute’s intent from its own version of the 
historical context of the statute216 and the non-binding dicta of 
Dunlop and Richmond Mortgage.217 The result of this analysis was the 
court’s subjective discussion of what was equitable, apart from the 
intent evinced by the statute’s language.218 As noted, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina has never explicitly addressed or explored 
how the plain meaning of the FMVOD statute makes a difference in 
the guaranty context.219 Instead, the High Point Bank court drastically 
changed its approach to post-foreclosure liability based on its 
purported understanding of the statute’s historical context.220 This 
Comment rejects applying the FMVOD as an equitable doctrine in 
favor of the North Carolina Court of Appeals’ original 
interpretation—that guarantors cannot reap the benefits of the 
FMVOD. 
As a reference, the language of the FMVOD statute is set forth 
below: 
When any sale of real estate has been made by a mortgagee, 
trustee, or other person authorized to make the same, at which 
the mortgagee, payee or other holder of the obligation thereby 
secured becomes the purchaser and takes title either directly or 
indirectly, and thereafter such mortgagee, payee or other 
holder of the secured obligation, as aforesaid, shall sue for and 
undertake to recover a deficiency judgment against the 
mortgagor, trustor or other maker of any such obligation whose 
property has been so purchased, it shall be competent and 
lawful for the defendant against whom such deficiency 
judgment is sought to allege and show as matter of defense and 
offset, but not by way of counterclaim, that the property sold 
was fairly worth the amount of the debt secured by it at the 
time and place of sale or that the amount bid was substantially 
 
 216. See supra Section III.C. Of course, the court had assistance from scholarship 
focusing on section 45-21.38 of the North Carolina General Statutes. See Currie & 
Lieberman, supra note 59, at 9–16.  
 217. See supra Sections II.B–.C. 
 218. See supra Section III.C. 
 219. See supra Part II. 
 220. See supra text accompanying notes 190–93. 
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less than its true value, and, upon such showing, to defeat or 
offset any deficiency judgment against him, either in whole or 
in part: Provided, this section shall not affect nor apply to the 
rights of other purchasers or of innocent third parties, nor shall 
it be held to affect or defeat the negotiability of any note, bond 
or other obligation secured by such mortgage, deed of trust or 
other instrument: Provided, further, this section shall not apply 
to foreclosure sales made pursuant to an order or decree of 
court nor to any judgment sought or rendered in any 
foreclosure suit nor to any sale made and confirmed prior to 
April 18, 1933.221 
To begin, the language of the FMVOD is plain and easy to decipher: 
when a property is sold pursuant to a power of sale, the “mortgagor, 
trustor, or other maker of any such obligation whose property has 
been so purchased” may “allege and show as a matter of defense and 
offset” that the price that the purchaser paid was “substantially less 
than” the fair market value of the property, and thereby “defeat or 
offset any deficiency judgment against him, either in whole or in 
part[.]”222 Per the language of this statute, any party who had a lender 
foreclose on its property pursuant to a power of sale has a right to 
assert that the property was worth the amount of the debt when 
pursued in a deficiency judgment. This defense, then, cannot be 
asserted in simply any deficiency judgment, but rather in a deficiency 
judgment against an individual whose property has been foreclosed. 
In the context of guaranties, unless the guarantor has a property 
interest in the foreclosed collateral, the guarantor cannot claim the 
protection of the FMVOD under this reading of the statute. 
Therefore, any court interpreting this statute can quite easily 
discern the object of this statute’s applicability because the statute 
itself defines the object in simple terms: as “the mortgagor, trustor, or 
other maker of such obligation whose property has been so 
purchased[.]”223 Moreover, the statute by its own terms is a 
“defense[.]”224 There is nothing to suggest that a nonjudicial 
foreclosure automatically triggers as an equitable method of debt 
calculation upon a lender’s instigation of a deficiency suit. Rather, it 
requires some initiative by a party seeking the protection of this 
statute “to allege and show as a matter of defense and offset” before 
 
 221. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36 (2016).  
 222. Id. (emphasis added). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
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the defense is effective.225 Because the language relating to the 
defense is so straightforward, there is really no room for 
interpretation by the courts; they are obliged under standard methods 
of judicial interpretation to apply the express text of the law as it has 
been unambiguously enacted.226 
Furthermore, applying standard rules of textual interpretation, 
the intended impact of the law could not be clearer. Pursuant to the 
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express inclusion of 
certain related terms implies the inapplicability of others not 
mentioned.227 The FMVOD statute states that it applies to a 
“mortgagor, trustor, or other maker of any such obligation whose 
property has been” purchased by a lender pursuant to power of 
sale.228 Noticeably absent from this list of individuals qualified to 
assert the FMVOD is the guarantor or any other secondary obligor. 
Thus, the inclusion of certain parties eligible to assert the FMVOD 
operates to the exclusion of other parties, like guarantors, who might 
seek to assert this defense. 
Similarly, the maxims noscitur a sociis229 and ejusdem generis230 
limit the meaning of “other maker of any such obligation” specifically 
to those who make an obligation secured by collateral foreclosed at a 
nonjudicial foreclosure sale.231 Without making explicit reference to 
these maxims, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina utilized these 
 
 225. Id. (emphasis added). 
 226. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“Where the language is 
plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise 
and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.”). 
 227. See Evans v. Diaz, 333 N.C. 774, 779–80, 430 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1993) (“Under the 
doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, when a statute lists the situations to which 
it applies, it implies the exclusion of situations not contained in the list.”); see also 
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 228. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36. 
 229. See Morecock v. Hood, 202 N.C 321, 323, 162 S.E. 730, 731 (1932) (“The maxim is, 
Noscitur a sociis: the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the 
meaning of words with which it is associated.”); see also Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A canon of construction holding that the meaning of an 
unclear word or phrase, esp. one in a list, should be determined by the words immediately 
surrounding it.”). 
 230. See Liborio v. King, 150 N.C. App. 531, 536, 564 S.E.2d 272, 275 (2002) (“Under 
the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term follows a specific one, the general 
term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific 
enumeration.” (quoting Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers’ Ass’n, 499 U.S. 
117, 129 (1991))); see also Ejusdem generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(“A canon of construction holding that when a general word or phrase follows a list of 
specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same 
class as those listed.”).  
 231. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36.  
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principles in its interpretation of the FMVOD statute to limit its 
application to those with a property interest in the foreclosed 
collateral.232 Ultimately, this Comment argues that these traditional 
maxims are hardly necessary to understand the purpose and meaning 
of the FMVOD statute. When the statute’s language clearly identifies 
the particular scenario in and parties to which the statute applies, 
there is no need for any additional analysis or input by judicial 
reasoning, which can become twisted when unbound from the 
codified words on the pages of the state’s statutes.233 Thus, when the 
FMVOD statute stated that it applied to a mortgagor or other party 
whose property was purchased at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, that 
party is exactly the party to whom it applies. 
B. Explaining the Reasoning Behind the High Point Bank Opinion 
Nevertheless, while a textual interpretation of the FMVOD 
would preclude guarantors from the benefit of the FMVOD, the High 
Point Bank court seems to have relied on the forgotten jurisprudence 
described in Section II.B to give guarantors the protection of the 
FMVOD. While the precedential effect of Dunlop is questionable, a 
closer look at the reasoning of Richmond Mortgage appears to offer 
more insight with regard to how the FMVOD might benefit 
guarantors.234 This Comment leaves open the possibility that the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina was not necessarily wrong in its 
interpretations of the Dunlop and Richmond Mortgage holdings. 
Those cases may be reasonably interpreted, as they were in High 
Point Bank, to broaden the class of persons who can assert the 
FMVOD to include guarantors. However, the justices of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina stood on questionable ground with respect 
to stare decisis at the time of High Point Bank. They could have made 
a legitimate decision either by following the Dunlop and Richmond 
Mortgage analyses or by following the line of cases the court implicitly 
endorsed for decades. 
This Section explores how the court’s interpretation of the 
forgotten jurisprudence was not entirely improper. Instead, the ruling 
creates unjust results for lenders and perverse incentives for 
borrowers and guarantors going forward that may adversely impact 
commercial lending for years to come. First, both the Court of 
 
 232. See supra Section III.B. 
 233. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 
(2010) (emphasizing, in an opinion by the late Justice Scalia, that the text of the statute 
should clearly dominate judicial considerations). 
 234. See supra Section II.B.  
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Appeals and Supreme Court of North Carolina’s reliance on Dunlop 
is understandable, but not quite to the extent that these courts relied 
on that case. Viewed at the Supreme Court of North Carolina level, 
Dunlop appears to be binding mandatory authority.235 Yet, this 
mischaracterizes Dunlop’s true holding—that a guarantor may plead 
the FMVOD.236  
Thus, High Point Bank treated Dunlop as mandatory authority. 
However, a more proper analysis of Dunlop would treat its dicta as 
persuasive authority. Truly, the power and relevance of Dunlop to the 
facts of High Point Bank lies within the persuasive power of that 
dicta, which delineates the reasoning for why a court might choose to 
extend the protection of the FMVOD statute to guarantors. When the 
High Point Bank court declared that Dunlop was “controlling[,]” it 
suggested that the court was bound by Dunlop.237 Instead, the court 
should have described the Dunlop dicta as merely persuasive and 
then adopted that reasoning as part of its own holding. Regardless of 
this (admittedly semantic) distinction, the outcome would not change. 
Which is why, as stated earlier in this discussion, the court’s reasoning 
was not entirely improper. 
Moreover, Richmond Mortgage also bears relevance as 
persuasive precedent but is not mandatory as the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina characterized it. Just as the procedural posture of 
Dunlop prevents it from controlling High Point Bank, so too do the 
facts and holding of Richmond Mortgage prevent it from being 
controlling. Richmond Mortgage dealt solely with the liability of 
primary borrowers.238 Further, the nature of the challenge of the 
FMVOD statute was constitutional—a challenge pursuant to the 
contracts clause of the United States Constitution—which made its 
holding relevant only as to the constitutionality of the FMVOD 
 
 235. See High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 368 N.C. 301, 306–07, 
776 S.E.2d 838, 842–43 (2015) (“Our holdings in Dunlop and Richmond Mortgage are 
controlling here.”). In contrast, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina stated it more 
accurately. See High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 231 N.C. App. 31, 
38–39, 750 S.E.2d 886, 891 (2013) (noting that “our Supreme Court has ruled the 
guarantor of a purchase money deed of trust is entitled to plead the anti-deficiency statute 
as a defense in an action brought on his personal guaranty” (emphasis added)), aff’d as 
modified, 368 N.C. 301, 776 S.E.2d 838 (2015). 
 236. See Va. Tr. Co. v. Dunlop, 214 N.C. 196, 198–99, 198 S.E. 645, 646 (1938). 
 237. High Point Bank, 368 N.C. at 307, 776 S.E.2d at 843; see supra text accompanying 
note 201; supra note 235 and accompanying text.  
 238. See Richmond Mortg. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., 210 N.C. 29, 
30–32, 185 S.E. 482, 482–84 (1936) (explaining the parties’ statuses and the original facts of 
the proceeding), aff’d, 300 U.S. 124 (1937).  
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statute.239 In light of the factual scenario and holding of Richmond 
Mortgage, when compared to High Point Bank, that case could only 
be persuasive authority at best. 
Nevertheless, like Dunlop, the Richmond Mortgage opinion’s 
persuasiveness is what makes its use in the High Point Bank court’s 
opinion reasonable. The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s language 
in Richmond Mortgage could lend itself to an interpretation of the 
statute that would allow for the “accounting” of the fair market value 
to the indebtedness, rather than the borrower itself.240 As Judge 
Dillon noted in his concurrence, this distinction is crucial to the 
availability of the FMVOD to guarantors.241 By treating the FMVOD 
as a defense based in equity rather than law, the court freed itself 
from being bound by the text of section 45-21.36 of the North 
Carolina General Statutes and instead relied on what seemed fair. It 
may have been the equitable nature of the FMVOD derived from the 
court’s dicta in Richmond Mortgage that encouraged the court to 
broaden the FMVOD statute’s protection to include guarantors, but 
regardless, the court’s reliance on Dunlop and Richmond Mortgage as 
controlling precedent is troubling as a matter of judicial 
interpretation. The muddling of the holding and dicta of that 
forgotten jurisprudence almost certainly influenced the court’s 
ultimate outcome and likely precluded the court from engaging in the 
textual analysis undertaken in Section IV.A of this Comment that 
would have led the court to a different result. 
Despite this mischaracterization of the precedential value of the 
forgotten jurisprudence, the court could have applied those cases as 
persuasive authority. As persuasive authority, the forgotten 
jurisprudence of Section II.B carried the same precedential weight as 
the trend of case law promulgated by the Court of Appeals of North 
Carolina discussed in Section II.C. The fact that the court chose to 
revive and expand forgotten jurisprudence accordingly is a matter of 
judicial preference rather than judicial compulsion. There is no 
reason to fault the court for making the choice it did, for the 
persuasive value of Dunlop and Richmond Mortgage could and did 
lead reasonable minds to a different conclusion than a textual analysis 
may otherwise have led them. However, despite the High Point Bank 
 
 239. See id. at 33, 185 S.E. at 484.  
 240. See id. at 34, 185 S.E. at 485. 
 241. See High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 231 N.C. App. 31, 40, 
750 S.E.2d 886, 892 (2013) (Dillon, J., concurring), aff’d as modified, 368 N.C. 301, 776 
S.E.2d 838 (2015). 
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court’s best intentions, as the next Part explains, the court’s ruling 
may end up providing inequitable results anyway. 
V.  THE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS PIVOT FROM HIGH POINT 
BANK: HOW LENDERS MIGHT AVOID THE CASE’S CONSEQUENCES 
AND FORCE GUARANTORS TO PAY THE PRICE 
How might lenders proceed in the wake of High Point Bank? As 
much as High Point Bank marks a victory for guarantors, well-settled 
North Carolina precedent has made it clear that, so long as the 
language of a guaranty is sufficient, guarantors still have the statutory 
option to waive the right granted to have the lender exhaust all 
collection options against the primary borrower before reaching the 
guarantor.242 This waiver gives lenders the upper hand in how they 
decide to pursue collection—by either pursuing collection against the 
debtor through foreclosure and the newly limited deficiency judgment 
process or avoiding foreclosure altogether by suing on the note and 
seeking relief from the guarantor primarily.243 The following sections 
explain how a creditor could theoretically collect deficiencies with the 
knowledge that guarantors can assert the FMVOD. 
A. Ex Ante Solutions: Contracting in Light of High Point Bank 
Drafters of commercial guaranty contracts have options to 
mitigate the effect that the High Point Bank ruling will have on 
lenders’ recovery from guarantors. The public policy support lent to 
the FMVOD in High Point Bank allows any express waiver of the 
FMVOD included in a guaranty contract to be unenforceable.244 This 
does not make obtaining a guaranty contract, however, a worthless 
endeavor. As the analysis of High Point Bank demonstrated, lenders 
will be able to collect any remaining deficiency following the 
 
 242. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	26-7 (2016); see also, e.g., Resolution Tr. Corp. v. 
Cunningham, 14 F.3d 596 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision). 
Lenders should note that a guaranty must contain more than language merely giving the 
title “guaranty of payment” to the guaranty. See Fed. Land Bank of Columbia v. Lieben, 
89 N.C. App. 395, 399–400, 366 S.E.2d 592, 595–96, aff’d, 323N.C. 741, 373 S.E.2d 439 
(1988) (mem.). Instead, to waive section 26-7 rights, the terms should expressly disclaim 
“any defense based on lack of due diligence by Lessor in collection, protection or 
realization upon any collateral securing the indebtedness[.]” Borg-Warner Acceptance 
Corp. v. Johnston, 97 N.C. App. 575, 580, 389 S.E.2d 429, 433 (1990). It might be argued in 
the future that guarantors cannot waive even the section 26-7 rights: the cases that held 
those rights waivable also held the FMVOD inapplicable to guarantors. See supra Part II. 
As this Comment has discussed throughout, the High Point Bank decision raises concerns 
about the applicability of this precedent. See supra Part III. 
 243. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 208–10.  
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accounting of the fair market value of foreclosed property to the 
borrower and guarantors.245 That deficiency could possibly still be 
substantial if the value of the collateral and the indebtedness are 
drastically different, and obtaining a guarantor may ensure more 
complete recovery in instances where the borrower’s assets have been 
exhausted. 
Nevertheless, lenders may want other ways to limit the increased 
costs that will accompany the High Point Bank ruling. First, lenders’ 
counsel should continue to include contractual language waiving all 
defenses broadly. This will obviously not be effective against the 
FMVOD after High Point Bank, but the waivers will exclude other 
potential defenses that have not been afforded the public policy 
protection. Second, the inclusion of language expressly creating 
guaranties of payment and not of collection is likely particularly 
important.246 Guaranties of payment are essential to allow lenders 
more latitude in pursuing full recovery, as it gives them options 
against whom to seek recovery, whether the guarantor, borrower, or 
both.247 Third, lenders’ counsel should consider including arbitration 
clauses in their guaranty contracts.248 This empowers post-High Point 
Bank lenders to privately and (hopefully) quickly wage the appraisal 
war that will ensue upon assertion of the FMVOD. Furthermore, an 
arbitrator may have a better understanding of the intricacies of real 
estate valuation and the market as a whole than a panel of jurors. 
 
 245. See supra Part III.  
 246. See PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY §	1:7(1)–(2) 
(2016) (stating that “payment guaranteed” or similar language is required to create a 
guaranty of payment, whereas “collection guaranteed” would create a guaranty of 
collection). 
 247. See 5-44 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW, supra note 28, §	44.03[3][b][i] (explaining how 
guaranties of payment provide more options). 
 248. See Amy J. Schmitz, Refreshing Contractual Analysis of ADR Agreements by 
Curing Bipolar Avoidance of Modern Common Law, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 22–23 
(2004). The appraisal procedure used in insurance law is a great illustration of how this 
process could work in deficiency judgments. Therein, if an insurer and insured disagree on 
the value of damaged or destroyed property, a third party determines the value instead. 
Id. Alternatively, reforming the appraisal process is another way to mitigate the 
consequences of High Point Bank going forward. One author suggests reforming 
deficiency judgments by inserting a quasi-judicial determination made by a neutral 
appraiser in the event that the lender’s and borrower’s appraisers disagree on the value of 
the collateral to be sold. See Alan M. Weinberger, Tools of Ignorance: An Appraisal of 
Deficiency Judgments, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 893–94 (2015). 
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B. Ex Post Solutions: Litigating to Circumvent Guarantors’ 
Assertions of the FMVOD 
1.  First Option: Stay the Course 
The strategically worst (yet still available) option is to continue 
pursuing deficiencies as lenders did prior to High Point Bank. Upon 
default, a lender would sue the borrower and guarantors, foreclose 
under power of sale, dismiss the borrower, and proceed to collect the 
remaining deficiency against the guarantors.249 Lenders would next 
move for summary judgment as to the amount of outstanding 
deficiency, and of course, the guarantors would then assert the 
FMVOD, as they have been allowed to do pursuant to High Point 
Bank.250 
The guarantor’s burden for asserting the FMVOD as an 
equitable defense is extraordinarily low, especially considering the 
litigation that will likely follow successfully asserting the FMVOD. 
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina dealt with this low burden 
recently, in United Community Bank (Georgia) v. Wolfe.251 
Defendants defaulted on a $350,000 loan, and the lender bid $275,000 
in a nonjudicial foreclosure, leaving a deficiency of approximately 
$50,000.252 The lender then moved for summary judgment in the 
deficiency action, which the trial court granted, but on appeal, the 
Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed, declaring that a 
genuine issue of material fact exists when the property owner states 
that she considered the fair value of the property to be higher than 
the price obtained at foreclosure.253 The case came with a twist: even 
 
 249. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.31(a)(4) (2016) (explaining that the remaining 
deficiency is calculated by the amount of debt at default minus amount credited from 
foreclosure sale). Prior to High Point Bank, in order to succeed on a motion for summary 
judgment, “[e]ssentially, all you had to do was get your math right, subtracting the bid 
price (less expenses) from the debt.” Martin, supra note 23. 
 250. See High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 368 N.C. 301, 309, 776 
S.E.2d 838, 844 (2015). 
 251. __ N.C. App. __, 775 S.E.2d 677 (2015), disc. review granted, __ N.C. __, 794 
S.E.2d 315 (2016) (mem.). 
 252. See id. at __, 775 S.E.2d at 678. 
 253. See id. at __, 775 S.E.2d at 680 (“[O]ur Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
the owner’s opinion of value is competent to prove the property’s value.”). But see TD 
Bank, N.A. v. Williams, __ N.C. App. __, 787 S.E.2d 74, 81 (2016). In TD Bank, the Court 
of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed a grant of summary judgment in the lender’s favor 
where the defendant-borrower/guarantor attempted to prove value of foreclosed property 
in 2016 by showing value of property in 2011. See id. The difference in these cases seems to 
indicate a fine line for when summary judgment will be granted, which could foreshadow 
uncertainty for lenders in the foreclosure and deficiency judgment process. 
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though the fair market value of the property was demonstrably less 
than the amount bid by the lender at the foreclosure sale, the mere 
fact that the property owners believed that the property was worth 
more was enough to defeat summary judgment and move to trial.254 
As simple as this burden is to meet for the borrower,255 this is an 
equally easy task for a guarantor to accomplish because the 
guarantors are often the owners of the entity that owns the 
property.256 
To avoid having the valuation of the property become an 
obstacle for collecting deficiencies, lenders who wish to seek a 
deficiency may want to consider raising the amount that they offer at 
nonjudicial foreclosures.257 For all the strategic maneuvering that 
could be done to circumvent the FMVOD, raising the bid at 
foreclosure may be the simplest. This option protects the lender-
borrower and lender-guarantor relationships merely by being more 
facially equitable. Borrowers and guarantors who feel that they have 
been treated fairly in foreclosure may be more willing to embark on 
mutually beneficial dealings with the same lender in the future. 
However, the greatest drawback to this option is that the formerly 
simple and efficient process of collection will now require further 
litigation costs, as guarantors asserting the FMVOD will change the 
deficiency judgment from a swift process of collection into a valuation 
battle.258 Furthermore, although this option seems simple, there are a 
few factors involved in determining the price offered at a foreclosure 
sale that would likely make the process more complicated than it 
appears.259 
2.  Second Option: Sue on the Note 
Another option for lenders to dodge the FMVOD is to sue on 
the note. Lenders could sue the borrower and guarantors for breach 
of contract and breach of guaranty, receive a favorable judgment, and 
 
 254. See Wolfe, __ N.C. App. at __, 775 S.E.2d at 679–80 (holding “[d]efendants’ 
opinion that their property was worth the amount of the debt is substantial evidence from 
which a jury could conclude that Defendants’ property, indeed, was worth the amount that 
was owed	.	.	.	.	summary judgment was improper.”). 
 255. See id. 
 256. Importantly, this was the case in High Point Bank. High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. 
Highmark Props., LLC, 368 N.C. 301, 302, 776 S.E.2d 838, 839 (2015).  
 257. See infra Section VI.B. 
 258. See DeVaney & Pearce, supra note 24 (“[D]eficiency cases could devolve into a 
trial of appraisal or value opinion experts or even the opinion of the lenders expert vs. the 
opinion of the property owner who the Appellate Courts have held is competent to state 
an opinion of value.”). 
 259. See id.  
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have the value of the debt serve as res judicata for any future 
adjudications of the amount of the debt. The greatest benefit of 
nonjudicial foreclosure is efficient recovery of debts in default.260 
However, if the efficiency benefit (or even the recovery of debt) is 
diminished or eliminated because of the FMVOD, pursuing the 
default in personam against the borrower and guarantor rather than 
in rem against the collateral becomes arguably worthwhile. Further, 
this strategy entirely avoids the FMVOD, which only applies to 
certain deficiency judgments post-foreclosure.261 
As with all options, this strategy has distinct benefits and 
disadvantages. The greatest advantage considered here is the ability 
to avoid the FMVOD. Instead of running the risk that the collateral 
will not achieve the full fair market value asserted by borrowers and 
guarantors, lenders instead can recover the indebtedness in full. 
However, the efficacy of this strategy will differ depending on the 
facts. For example, when a borrower is in default, it is presumably 
because they no longer have liquid assets to pay the debts as they 
become due. In such cases, to recover against the borrower, the 
lender must resort to foreclosing on collateral securing the loan, 
especially in instances when the borrower is on the brink of 
bankruptcy.262 This scenario is particularly relevant in situations 
where the guarantor has the potential to be held liable for more than 
she may have originally anticipated.263 Lenders press for guaranty 
contracts in commercial lending transactions because of the financial 
strength of the guarantor, inter alia, so a well-heeled guarantor could 
be liable for the entire amount of indebtedness at default if lenders 
pursue the “sue-on-the-note” strategy.264 
 
 260. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (emphasizing the increased efficiency 
that nonjudicial foreclosure affords). 
 261. See Esser, supra note 22. 
 262. See supra text accompanying notes 41–43.  
 263. See supra text accompanying note 40. As discussed, liability carries numerous 
possible risks. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
 264. See Am. Foods, Inc. v. Goodson Farms, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 591, 597, 275 S.E.2d 
184, 185, aff’d per curiam, 304 N.C. 368, 283 S.E.2d 517 (1981) (illustrating that North 
Carolina courts have refused to allow guarantor-owners to assert the FMVOD by nature 
of their ownership of the borrower-company, as it would “pierce the corporate veil in a 
unique way”). The practice of having the borrower-company’s owners sign guaranty 
contracts would end limited liability for each commercial lending transaction in which the 
owner participates. Of course, the continued applicability of this case law is questionable 
considering it is interpreting the FMVOD statute, which has been thrown into chaos by 
High Point Bank. 
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3.  Third Option: Go “Topsy-Turvy” and Sue the Guarantor 
A final option is in the same vein as suing both the borrower and 
the guarantor—simply sue the guarantor for breach of guaranty, 
without seeking recovery against the borrower. As noted above, 
North Carolina courts have discussed the option of a waiver of the 
statute, allowing lenders the choice of pursuing the guarantor before 
exhausting any and all options for collection against the borrower.265 
So long as the guaranty contract contains sufficient language to create 
such a waiver,266 the lender would be able to recover from the 
guarantor without even suing the borrower at all.267 The danger here 
is that, if the contract does not sufficiently waive section	26-7,268 then 
section 26-9, which provides that a creditor’s lack of diligence in 
pursuing the debt forfeits a right to recovery against a surety or 
guarantor,269 would kick in to prevent further collection attempts by 
the lender against the guarantor. 
However, the guarantor is not without options in this scenario. 
Guarantors could try to join the borrower as a party to the action.270 
Additionally, the guarantor could pay the debt, and then, pursuant to 
its subrogation rights granted by section 26-3.1 of the North Carolina 
General Statutes, sue the primary borrower for reimbursement.271 
The upside to this strategy for lenders is that it leaves disposition of 
the collateral as the guarantor’s burden.272 
 
 265. See supra text accompanying notes 242–43 (discussing a waiver with respect to 
section 26-7 of the North Carolina General Statutes). 
 266. In other words, so long as the guaranty contract is a guaranty of payment, not of 
collection, a waiver could be created. For a summary of the differences, see supra text 
accompanying notes 34–36.  
 267. There are certainly ethical issues with this approach. The primary borrower 
should be pursued first for deficiencies by nature of the fact that he not only took the loan 
for his sole benefit, but also instituted the chain of events that ultimately leads to the 
guarantor being liable for the borrower’s default. However, as a pure discussion of 
strategic options, this should be considered, especially in light of a guarantor’s express 
waiver of section 26-7. 
 268. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	26-7 (2016). 
 269. See id. §	26-9. 
 270. Although section 26-12 of the North Carolina General Statutes allows “joinder of 
debtor by surety,” such joinder is permissive. See id. §	26-12; see also Borg-Warner 
Acceptance Corp. v. Johnston, 97 N.C. App. 575, 580, 389 S.E.2d 429, 432 (1990). The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that section 26-12 applies to guarantors. See 
High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 368 N.C. 301, 308–09, 776 S.E.2d 
838, 843–44 (2015). 
 271. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	26-3.1.  
 272. Id. §	53C-5-2(i)(2). North Carolina banking regulations prohibit state-chartered 
banks from holding foreclosed collateral longer than five years, unless the banking 
commissioner grants a bank’s application for an extension; consequently, North Carolina 
banks generally must dispose of property bought at foreclosure sale before that time, 
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Of course, the availability of this option brings about the “topsy-
turvy world” foreseen by Judge Posner in Chivas.273 The traditional 
notion of the guarantor as a backup for lenders is flipped on its head, 
since the availability of the FMVOD to guarantors likely incentivizes 
lenders to sue on the note and forgo foreclosure entirely. Before High 
Point Bank, it behooved lenders to seek nonjudicial foreclosure, grant 
the borrower the benefit of the credit bid, and seek a deficiency 
against guarantors for the remainder, which generally led to a full 
recovery upon liquidation of the purchased collateral.274 After High 
Point Bank, deficiency judgments are a potentially wasteful 
addendum to the otherwise efficient nonjudicial foreclosure process. 
Admittedly, lenders could almost always obtain a swift summary 
judgment against guarantors for the post-foreclosure deficiency.275 
Today, however, the non-movant’s extraordinarily low burden for 
defeating summary judgment means that deficiency judgments could 
spiral into profligate appraisal battles that ultimately leave the lender 
unsatisfied with the recovery of the loan. In light of this risk, lenders 
may well choose to simplify the process: sue the guarantors first, 
ignore the party that caused the default in the first place, receive full 
repayment, and wash their hands of the whole transaction. 
Similarly, one last option is to seek judicial foreclosure. Since the 
FMVOD applies only to certain nonjudicial foreclosures, the lender 
could also sue for judicial foreclosure. Ultimately, this avenue may be 
a better option for lenders. Considering how lengthy and expensive 
the post-foreclosure deficiency process will be after High Point Bank, 
the agonizing procedure of judicial foreclosure may prove to be 
profitable if lenders can obtain the collateral at a price similar to what 
they would pay at nonjudicial foreclosure.276 Indeed, this multitude of 
options available to lenders contributes to making the post-High 
Point Bank deficiency judgment process so chaotic. North Carolina’s 
deficiency judgment process is not topsy-turvy solely because of the 
incentive to pursue deficiencies from a party other than the defaulting 
 
regardless of the prevailing economic conditions. See id. A prolonged economic downturn 
would cause banks to realize further losses by forcing them to sell in spite of a depressed 
housing market. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. Such a downturn could 
jeopardize the economy further due to the ripple effect caused by a failing bank. See supra 
note 69 and accompanying text. Guarantors tasked with disposing of property would be 
arguably better suited in this scenario, as they could hold onto the property beyond a five-
year period and resell at a profit.  
 273. Inland Mortg. Capital Corp. v. Chivas Retail Partners, LLC, 740 F.3d 1146, 1150 
(7th Cir. 2014). 
 274. See supra text accompanying notes 44–49. 
 275. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra Section V.A. 
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debtor. The sheer uncertainty facing defaulting borrowers and their 
guarantors at an already difficult moment further unbalances the 
deficiency judgment process. Before High Point Bank, a borrower 
and guarantor could expect a lender to choose two options: judicial 
foreclosure or nonjudicial foreclosure. Now, the decision tree 
branching from nonjudicial foreclosure makes the guarantor in 
particular subject to the whims of the lender. Considering the 
multitude of options facing lenders and the uncertainty facing 
defaulting borrowers and their guarantors, the time has come for 
lawmakers to right the ship. 
VI.  LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS TO HIGH POINT 
BANK’S CONSEQUENCES 
Regardless of whether one considers the High Point Bank case 
rightly decided, one thing is clear: while the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina intended to extend the FMVOD’s benefits to guarantors, 
new lending strategies designed to avoid this ruling could undermine 
High Point Bank’s positive impact for guarantors. Lenders no longer 
have an incentive to foreclose collateral before seeking recovery from 
guarantors if the lender anticipated a deficiency post-foreclosure. 
Lacking that incentive, lenders will likely more frequently pursue 
recovery against guarantors and leave the headaches of the 
foreclosure process to a guarantor’s subrogation rights. In light of this 
outcome, the time is ripe for the North Carolina legislature to revisit 
the anti-deficiency statutes and correct this misalignment in the 
nonjudicial foreclosure and deficiency suit system.277 North Carolina 
has changed enough in the past century to merit an update to this 
Depression-era law, and such an update would take borrowers’ and 
lenders’ increased sophistication into account, as well as allow them 
 
 277. Comprehensive reform may be useful, though this Comment finds no overarching 
errors in North Carolina’s nonjudicial foreclosure process generally, and comprehensive 
reform is beyond this Comment’s scope. That being said, a case could be made for 
uniformity in North Carolina and beyond. See generally Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the 
Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 
PEPP. L. REV. 583 (2010) (detailing available models for comprehensive foreclosure 
reform and recommending federal legislative action pursuant to the commerce power in 
order to create uniformity among the states). Various alternatives are available, including 
adopting a “one-action” rule similar to the one exemplified in California statutes. See 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §	726 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. laws). This 
Comment endorses an overhaul of the power of sale foreclosure in North Carolina by 
adopting the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act (“UNFA”). For an excellent 
discussion of the benefits of the UNFA, see generally Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. 
Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE 
L.J. 1399 (2004) (analyzing the numerous benefits of the UNFA). 
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to bargain for contract terms without imposing paternalistic notions 
of fairness.278 This Comment posits several avenues for reform, 
ranging in degree and kind. 
A. A Return to Normalcy 
The simplest means of restoring normalcy for guarantors is for 
the legislature to take steps to clarify that the FMVOD statute is only 
applicable to those who have a property interest in the foreclosed 
collateral and is a legal defense that is not meant to serve as an 
equitable method of debt calculation. As a textual reading of the 
FMVOD statute demonstrates,279 this was likely the legislature’s 
original intent. Importantly, the North Carolina judiciary upheld that 
interpretation for decades, as demonstrated by multiple appellate 
rulings and the fact that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has 
refrained from holding such an interpretation objectionable or 
unconscionable.280 A return to this system will probably not satisfy 
critics of the former reading of the FMVOD statute because 
guarantors will no longer benefit from the FMVOD. However, the 
benefits of returning to the previous state of the law may outweigh 
critics’ concerns if the topsy-turvy world comes to fruition. The post-
foreclosure deficiency process is a known entity under the pre-High 
Point Bank interpretation of the FMVOD statute, granting lenders, 
borrowers, and guarantors certainty when entering the often 
uncertain foreclosure process. The topsy-turvy world of seeking 
deficiencies from guarantors first will not obtain comparable results; a 
return to normalcy will not incentivize lenders to forego the 
foreclosure process. 
Alternatively, the legislature could redraft the FMVOD statute 
to include the guarantor as a party that may assert the FMVOD, 
while expressly allowing for waiver of the defense.281 This option 
allows sophisticated parties to contract with each other in the 
 
 278. Cf. Roger J. Johns & Mark S. Blodgett, Fairness at the Expense of Commercial 
Certainty: The International Emergence of Unconscionability and Illegality as Exceptions to 
the Independence Principle of Letters of Credit and Bank Guarantees, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
297, 334 (2011) (arguing that public policy exceptions to guaranty agreements 
“damage	.	.	.	commercial certainty, in general, by elevating fairness-based judgments about 
the risk-allocation choices of the parties to the underlying contract above the certainty-
dependent environment that underpins	.	.	.	[sophisticated] transactions”).  
 279. See supra Section IV.A. 
 280. See supra Part II. 
 281. Arguably, the legislature ought to redraft the FMVOD statute to include 
guarantors to fit more neatly with High Point Bank. However, considering the fact that the 
High Point Bank interpretation is now law in North Carolina, this is not really necessary. 
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intended manner. While non-waiver of the FMVOD due to public 
policy has been pioneered by the court’s determination of fairness, 
prohibiting waiver of such defenses by freely contracting parties 
removes options from the table and necessitates a reallocation of 
costs and benefits. The inability of parties to agree to a waiver of the 
FMVOD may lead to higher interest rates on commercial loans, 
resulting from the reduced value of the credit enhancement that the 
guaranty contract represents.282 A legislative clarification of the 
waivability of this defense could maintain the value of guaranty 
contracts for all parties to a transaction and allow more freedom of 
contract. 
B. Share the Wealth: Encourage Lenders to Bid Higher at 
Nonjudicial Foreclosure 
The problems discussed in this Comment begin and end with the 
foreclosure bid. The analysis contained herein shows equities can tip 
towards lenders or borrowers with slight shifts in appraisal. As such, 
certain reforms may be helpful in encouraging lenders to increase 
their foreclosure bid so that borrowers receive a fair value for their 
collateral at foreclosure. This fair value should also account for the 
likely significant transaction costs incurred by lenders in obtaining, 
maintaining, and liquidating real property. In a perfect world, the 
lender would bid the fair market value of the property and obtain the 
remaining deficiency from the borrower and guarantors, leaving the 
lender with 100% repayment.283 In reality, the amount bid at 
foreclosure sale and the amount that the property finally sells for can 
be higher or lower than the fair market value at the time of 
foreclosure.284 Generally, this is not considered in determining 
deficiency costs, but the bid ultimately acts as an important factor in 
perceived inequities.285 Lenders get a bad hand when they have to 
liquidate property for less than they paid, and borrowers and 
guarantors get an unfair deal when the price bid at foreclosure is less 
 
 282. See Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief of N.C. Bankers’ Ass’n, Inc. at 
2–3, High Point Bank & Tr. Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 231 N.C. App. 31, 750 S.E.2d 
886 (2013) (No. COA13-331), https://www.ncappellatecourts.org/show-file.php?document
_id=139735 [https://perma.cc/46EL-8M5J] (“If allowed to stand, the ruling would have a 
severe chilling effect on lenders’ ability and willingness to extend credit to individuals and 
businesses across the state when the security for that credit includes real estate 
collateral.”).  
 283. See supra Part I.  
 284. See supra Part I.  
 285. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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than the property was worth as evidenced by a higher value at a 
subsequent sale by the lender.286 
One commentator recommends the adoption of a reform called 
the “deficiency forfeiture sale” that may encourage lenders to 
increase their bids at foreclosure sales.287 In essence, the sale deters 
low foreclosure bids by punishing lenders who substantially 
undervalue real property at foreclosure sales.288 The mechanics of the 
deficiency forfeiture sale are as follows: (1) collateral is sold at 
nonjudicial foreclosure; (2) the borrower retains a “transferable call 
option” and seeks a third party to sell the property to at a price higher 
than what was bid at the foreclosure sale; and (3) if the borrower 
finds a buyer, the lender only receives what it bid at foreclosure, and 
the deficiency it may collect is reduced further as the difference 
between the debt at default and the value obtained by the borrower 
in its efforts to sell to a third party.289 While this reform would 
certainly encourage lenders to bid higher at foreclosure, the 
shortcomings of the deficiency forfeiture sale are serious. These 
disadvantages include increased incentives to fraudulently create 
sham transactions to the benefit of borrowers and a lengthened 
foreclosure process at lenders’ expense.290 
Another option is to define what percentage of fair market value 
qualifies as “substantially less” in a nonjudicial sale that would trigger 
application of the FMVOD, as this would set a minimum bid target 
for lenders at nonjudicial sale and would allow them to raise the 
amount they might have bid otherwise.291 The percentage of fair 
market value that is substantial enough to avoid the FMVOD should 
account for the transaction costs and potential decreases in property 
value that lenders will face in holding and liquidating the acquired 
property. At the moment, the state judiciary defines what is 
“substantially less” on a case-by-case basis.292 The Court of Appeals 
 
 286. See Weinberger, supra note 248, at 840 (noting how property is sold “under the 
hammer” during economic depressions for drastically lower prices than the intrinsic value 
of the property might otherwise suggest). 
 287. Stephen Guynn, Note, A Market-Based Tool to Reduce Systematic Undervaluation 
of Collateral in Residential Mortgage Foreclosures, 100 VA. L. REV. 587, 590 (2014). 
 288. See id. 
 289. See id. at 610. 
 290. See id. at 623–27. 
 291. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36 (2016).  
 292. See Blue Ridge Sav. Bank, Inc. v. Mitchell, 218 N.C. App. 410, 413, 721 S.E.2d 
322, 325, aff’d, 366 N.C. 331, 734 S.E.2d 572 (2012) (mem.). In Blue Ridge Savings, Judge 
Hunter authored the dissent; he described the difficulties of setting a bright-line rule for 
what is “substantially less,” noting that 
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of North Carolina has declared that 80% of fair market value is 
“substantially less” under the FMVOD statute, while 90% of fair 
market value is not.293 Legislative reform could provide a better 
solution and more certainty for lenders in determining their bids 
approaching fair market value at a foreclosure sale. The Uniform 
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, for example, sets the “substantially less” 
standard number at 90% of the fair market value, which would leave 
lenders a 10% cushion to pay for costs of liquidation.294 Of course, the 
problem with this method of reform (and with setting any bright-line 
rule) is arbitrariness—lenders may very well spend more than 10% 
less than fair market value on trying to sell the property, and they 
could lose more than 10% in subsequent value because of an 
enduring depression. However, given the unsettled state of the 
definition of “substantially less” in North Carolina, this arbitrariness 
could be a welcome shot of certainty in the foreclosure process for 
lenders and debtors alike. 
Ultimately, though, this Comment argues that the simplest 
solution may be the best solution in the end: lenders should make 
efforts to present an appropriately priced bid at nonjudicial 
foreclosure sales, especially where they are the only bidders. By 
increasing their economic costs at the front end (at foreclosure), 
lenders can avoid both economic and time costs on the back end by 
decreasing the likelihood that a borrower or guarantor might assert 
the FMVOD and claim that the price paid at the foreclosure sale was 
“substantially less” than the fair market value of the property.295  
All in all, the sea change in the foreclosure and deficiency 
judgment process that High Point Bank created could be remedied by 
any number of the foregoing solutions. Clearly, this area of the law 
requires some change—either in lenders’ collection strategies or 
 
what is “substantially less” is also a uniquely individualized and subjective issue: 
where a ninety cent bid on a property worth one dollar (a ten percent less bid) 
may not be “substantially less” than the property’s true value, a $900,000 bid on a 
property worth $1,000,000 (also a ten percent less bid) may be. 
Id. at 416, 721 S.E.2d at 326 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §	45-21.36). 
 293. See id. at 413, 721 S.E.2d at 325. 
 294. UNIF. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACT §	608 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); 
see also Nelson & Whitman, supra note 277, at 1491–93 (clarifying the UNFA rule with 
examples). 
 295. Perhaps this view is naive. As discussed, lenders do not gratuitously underbid at 
foreclosures, and deficiency judgment defendants may still assert the FMVOD regardless 
of the price bid. But this Comment hopes that as lenders bid higher in good faith, 
borrowers and guarantors will also act in good faith by accepting lenders’ higher bids 
rather than costing both parties more in litigation costs by asserting the FMVOD. 
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through legislative reform—to set the topsy-turvy world created by 
High Point Bank upright once more. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the statutory language and decades of contradictory 
holdings, rediscovered values and interpretations guide guarantors’ 
assertions of the FMVOD today. The legal reasoning employed in 
reviving the forgotten jurisprudence of the 1930s may not have been 
wrong, considering the language of the Richmond Mortgage and 
Dunlop opinions, but the North Carolina courts ignored these 
holdings for many decades. This lapse in precedent suggests that 
extending the FMVOD to guarantors was not as important or 
necessary for equity as High Point Bank indicated in its qualified 
holding that the FMVOD is non-waivable due to public policy 
concerns. 
Nevertheless, in so holding, the North Carolina judiciary created 
a significant loophole for guarantors securing collateral that may 
enter a nonjudicial foreclosure. This holding may also create 
unintended incentives for lenders, as the new framework forces them 
to exploit the litigation process to collect their debts in full. The 
preexisting case law allowing lenders to pursue guarantors first may 
very well mean lenders will pursue well-heeled guarantors every time 
a borrower defaults, making the post-default world especially topsy-
turvy. Therefore, in order to remedy this disorderly result, the 
legislature should take a second look at the FMVOD statute and laws 
surrounding nonjudicial foreclosure to inject some stability into the 
process. There are a number of options available, and ultimately, any 
one of the reforms outlined above would help stabilize the chaos 
facing the real estate foreclosure process post-High Point Bank. At 
this point, it is distinctly important for lawmakers—both legislative 
and judicial—to take action. It is necessary to right the ship of the 
foreclosure process that High Point Bank made uncertain. 
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